[Whonix-devel] [qubes-devel] Re: not getting compromised while applying apt-get upgrade for CVE-2016-1252

[Marek Marczykowski-Górecki]

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On Sat, Dec 17, 2016 at 12:20:04AM +0100, Julian Andres Klode wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 16, 2016 at 10:32:00PM +0000, Patrick Schleizer wrote:
> > Could you please provide information on how long safe / unsafe lines are
> > or how to detect them?
> > 
> > Ideally could you please provide some sanity check command that could be
> > used to detect malicious InRelease files such as 'find /var/lib/apt
> > -name '*InRelease*' -size +2M' or so?
> 
> Checking that wc -L (longest line) of the release file is reasonably small
> (like 256, 512, or 1024) should be enough. Currently, it's about 140 chars
> for unstable.

wc -L seems like a good one-liner, thanks!

> > The problem is,
> > 
> > - debootstrap can only bootstrap from one source such as
> > 'http://ftp.de.debian.org/debian' - which still contains vulnerable apt.
> > (Correct me if I am wrong, I would hope to be wrong on that one.)
> 
> Right now yes. That will contain a new APT in a point release. That said,
> there might be issues in debootstrap's Release file verification, someone
> should check that...

It looks like it uses Release.gpg, so this bug do not apply, right?

- -- 
Best Regards,
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Invisible Things Lab
A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text.
Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing?
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