Author: Patrick Schleizer
Patrick started developing Whonix, the Anonymous Operating System in 2012, when quickly others joined efforts. He collected experiences working pseudonymous on Whonix for two years, enjoys collaboratively working on privacy preserving software.

Advanced Deanonymization Attacks

A number of advanced deanonymization attacks. These do not just apply to Whonix, but any anonymity system. Some are also general security issues. Rather than exploiting bugs in the hypervisor to break out, some of these attacks rely on the

Qubes-Whonix TemplateVMs – Testers Wanted!

Qubes-Whonix only! Ideally for this testers wanted task, start fresh. Rename or delete both Whonix VMs sys-whonix and anon-whonix, reinstall whonix-gw and whonix-ws Qubes-Whonix templates. See the following instructions. Note: use qubes-dom0-unstable rather than qubes-templates-community then recreate Whonix VMs.

Testers wanted! Tor, anon-gw-anoynmizer-config and qubes-whonix upgrades

Upgraded packages have been added to Whonix jessie-proposed-updates and testers repository. newer Tor version anon-gw-anoynmizer-config 1.9.2 – bugfix newer qubes-whonix version 5.7-1 – It contains various bug fixes to ensure Qubes R3.2 compatibility. If you can, please enable such

corridor, a Tor traffic whitelisting gateway, a clearnet leak tester

After making the second step, posting how to use corridor, a Tor traffic whitelisting gateway with Qubes-Whonix, I will hereby do the first step, posting a general announcement of an interesting third party project, corridor. Please forget about Whonix for

Using corridor, a Tor traffic whitelisting gateway with Qubes-Whonix

corridor is a Tor traffic whitelisting gateway. It is a filtering gateway. Not a proxying gateway. It can also be used as a BridgeFirewall. This is not necessarily more anonymous. It is an additional fail-save Tor traffic whitelisting firewall that

combining Tor with a VPN or proxy can make you less anonymous

Using a VPN, proxy or SSH can can negatively affect anonymity under some circumstances. [1] [2] To explain why that is, some background information is required so you can draw conclusions and take actions to avoid this risk. See below.

Your MAC Address Randomization attempts are futile!

The following paper explains why. Why MAC Address Randomization is not Enough: An Analysis of Wi-Fi Network Discovery Mechanisms The above interesting paper has been found by HulaHoop and added to Whonix MAC address documentation.

Gathering Feedback of new Whonix Homepage Draft

We have been discussing a new Whonix homepage (old) and new Whonix download page (old) for a while now. The draft has been created by Ego and we are now be counseled by ura design, Elio Qoshi (@elioqoshi) (who has

Whonix logo has been refined

We are excited to reveal that our very own Whonix logo has been slightly refined, offering now better support for smaller screens and more mediums. We also have new profile image based on the logo for social media usage. Head

Looking for firejail / seccomp maintainer for better security!

(repost) firejail is a sandbox to restrict the application environment. Please contribute. Task: play around with firejail in Whoinx see how it goes report (and possibly fix) issues upstream in firejail test the Tor Browser firejail profile, consider packaging it