From Whonix


protects against guard discovery and related traffic analysis attacks.

To better understand vanguards it is helpful to have basic knowledge on Tor Entry Guards.

To learn more about vanguards see Announcing Vanguards for Onion Services [archive] blog post by The Tor Project, security readme [archive] by vanguards author Tor developer Mike Perry on attacks against onion services and defenses.

Additional resources include vanguard's technical readme [archive] and Whonix ™ forum vanguards integration development discussion [archive].

onionbalance [archive] for v3 onion services is in development as started in this ticket [archive] and Tor development mailing list - Request for onionbalance v3 pre-alpha testing [archive].

Quote Tor CVE-2020-8516 Hidden Service deanonymization [archive]:

The daemon in Tor through and 0.4.2.x through does not verify that a rendezvous node is known before attempting to connect to it, which might make it easier for remote attackers to discover circuit information.

vanguards fixes this. [archive]

vanguards is by default in Whonix ™ and above.

Log Analysis[edit]

Quote What do the logs mean? [archive]:

This is an experimental addon with many heuristics that still need tuning. Events that represent severe issues are at WARN level. You should react to these events. Warns are currently emitted for the following conditions:

1. When your service is disconnected from the Tor network, we WARN. Downtime can be a side channel signal or a passive information leak, and you should ensure your Internet connection is reliable to minimize downtime of your service as much as possible. 2. When a hidden service descriptor circuit sends more than 30KB, we WARN. If this happens, it is either a bug, a heavily-modified hidden service descriptor, or an actual attack. 3. When you set ExcludeNodes in Tor to exclude countries, but do not give Tor a GeoIP file, we WARN. 4. If you disable killing circuits in the rendguard component, we WARN when use counts for rends are exceeded. 5. With Tor and above, we WARN upon receipt of any dropped/ignored cell.

Events that are detected by heuristics that still need tuning are at NOTICE level. They may be a bug, a false positive, or an actual attack. If in doubt, don't panic. Please check the Github issues [archive] to see if any known false positives are related to these lines, and if not, consider filing an issue. Please redact any relay fingerprints from the messages before posting.


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