1 Qubes Persistence
2 Debian Template
3 bind-dirs vs Tor
4 Config Files Changes
5 IPs
6 Tor Browser
7 Run updates over Proxy/Tor
8 Time Sync
- 8.1 Introduction
- 8.2 Instructions
9 How big is Qubes OS's user base?
10 IP Spoofing Protection
11 Inter-VM Networking
12 Forum Discussion
13 IP
- 13.1 grep -r 10.152.152.10 *
- 13.2 grep -r 10.152.152.11 *
14 Misc
15 Time
16 tb-updater vs TemplateVM
- 16.1 prerequisite knowledge
- 16.2 Implementation as of Qubes-Whonix 11
- 16.3 Brainstorming
- 16.4 Forum Discussion
17 UpdateVM
18 Upgrade through Clearnet
- 18.1 Qubes R3.2
- 18.2 Qubes R4
19 Build
- 19.1 Build Single Qubes Package
  - 19.1.1 Debian dev
  - 19.1.2 Fedora rpm
- 19.2 Build Qubes-Whonix Templates
- 19.3 Official Builds
20 Test
21 Qubes VM Manger Firewall Tab Settings
22 Qubes Upstream Bugs
23 stable vs testing
24 Handling of file system in TemplateVMs vs TemplateBasedVMs
- 24.1 Qubes R3
- 24.2 Qubes Proposal
25 Split GPG
26 sys-whonix as Qubes FirewallVM
27 Connection Issues
28 Matrix of Qubes VM Types
29 Network in TemplateVMs
30 Torified Updates Proxy
- 30.1 sys-whonix
- 30.2 Whonix TemplateVMs
  - 30.2.1 Qubes R3.2
  - 30.2.2 Qubes R4
- 30.3 Related
31 Updates Proxy Debugging
32 Troubleshooting
- 32.1 Connectivity Issues
33 bind-dirs flow chart
34 qubes-whonix-postinit.service flow chart
35 Qubes-Whonix 14 release testing
36 lightdm autologin
37 ssh into Qubes dom0
38 releasever
39 R3.1 template package in dom0 R3.2
40 UEFI
41 yubikey
42 Qubes VM debug mode
43 salt
- 43.1 Qubes R3.2
- 43.2 Qubes R4
44 qvm-tags
- 44.1 Introduction
- 44.2 anon-vm tag
- 44.3 anon-gateway tag
- 44.4 whonix-updatevm tag
- 44.5 view tags
45 tags inheritance
46 qvm-features
47 Connection through Qubes Updates Proxy
- 47.1 R3.2
- 47.2 R4
48 Testing Automated
49 See Also
50 Footnotes

Qubes Persistence[edit]

Table: Qubes R4 Inheritance and Persistence

	Inheritance ^[1]	Persistence ^[2]
TemplateVM	n/a	Everything
TemplateBasedVM	/etc/skel/ to /home/	/rw/ (includes /home/ and `bind-dirs`)
DVM Template ^[3]	/etc/skel/ to /home/	/rw/ (includes /home/ and `bind-dirs`)
DisposableVM	/rw/ (includes /home/ and `bind-dirs`)	Nothing

Debian Template[edit]

https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/qubes-devel/EBxvtMlwp5k

bind-dirs vs Tor[edit]

Does bind-dirs will be run before /lib/systemd/system/tor@default.service?

Yes.

qubes-mount-dirs.service has Before=local-fs.target, which it ordered before sysinit.target. After=sysinit.target in turns is included by default (unless DefaultDependencies=noDefaultDependencies=no).

Config Files Changes[edit]

source

I don't know how rpm packaging works. However, the TorVM rpm packaging seems simpler to me and introduce less overhead than Debian packaging at first view. Is there something like config-package-dev for Fedora? config-package-dev is a package to overtake ownership of other > package's files. Such as, in Debian the Tor package owns /usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc. Whonix needs to modify that file and keep it updated. config-package-dev can be used to avoid getting the file being overwritten when upstream releases and upgrade. Is there something like this for Fedora or is this even required? That would make a port much simpler, because for many parts, it is just diverted config files.

qubes-tor pacakages provides own config file (tor --defaults-torrc option used), so no need to override the one provided by tor package.

But to answer your question - no, rpm do not have option to take ownership of files from other packages, but to workaround this (rather sensible) limitation you can modify the config in triggers (so the file will be modified after each original package update).

IPs[edit]

source

Qubes uses non-fixed LAN IPs? How do internal LAN IPs get assigned to TorVM / AppVMs?

QubesVm IP address is generated based on its netvm ID (subnet number) and the said VM static ID, so unless user is switching netvm, the IP is pretty static. We've chosen 10.137.<subnet-id>.<vm-id> which is quite exotic so conflicts with real LAN are very rare (even if rather harmless in isolated network).

Tor Browser[edit]

source

In your Torless TBB launcher script for use with Qubes' transparent Tor proxy, TOR_SOCKS_HOST=10.137.3.1. Is this supposed to be the same for all Qubes machines regardless of how many ProxyVMs users have created (or other user settings)? Or is the user supposed to change this before using the script?

Perhaps it is good idea to add some firewall rule in TorVM to redirect traffic to any 10.137.0.0/16 IP + port 9050/9049 to the tor running in TorVM. This way AnonVM can use any IP as a sock proxy address.

Run updates over Proxy/Tor[edit]

source

Without wasting a lot space, having lots of standalone VMs... How could one persistently install software in QubesOS using package managers over Tor just for a specific VM? Routing all traffic over Tor is also an option, but not a ideal one either (having some clearnet traffic is better for various reasons).

Set TorVM as netvm for the template. By default template updates are routed via "update proxy" (simple http proxy, which allow access only to yum-repository-like sites). This proxy is running in netvm, so after TorVM. Because of that its you need to disable 'yum-proxy-setup' service for this template and allow some traffic in the firewall settings. Or enable 'qubes-yum-proxy' service in TorVM and ensure that its traffic goes through tor.

Time Sync[edit]

Introduction[edit]

Discussion about insecurity of NTP:
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-devel/YHK_rAUm0s0/ARrBPHrf0fkJ

source

Can Qubes OS leave VM's clocks untouched and keep time sync to the VM or is there some forced-VM-timesync-with-dom-0 that can not be turned off? In that case, that would be a bad.

Currently time synchronization is done in some silly way: qvm-sync-clock called each 6min from dom0 cron. That tool fetch the current time using ntpdate in netvm (VM set as clockvm in qubes-prefs), then pass the result to 'date -s' in each VM.

You can disable this mechanism globally by unsetting(*) clockvm (qubes-prefs -s clockvm none).

(*) Which apparently was broken, fix will be included in updates soon.

Instructions[edit]

UNTESTED!

Install a comfortable editor (optional!).

sudo qubes-dom0-update kate

Edit your VM settings. (Feel free to drop 'EDITOR=kate' and/or to use an editor of your choice.)

sudo EDITOR=kate virsh edit whonix-ws

Find the following block.

<clock offset='utc' adjustment='reset'>
   <timer name='tsc' mode='native'/>
</clock>

Replace it with the following.

  <clock offset='utc'>
    <timer name='rtc' tickpolicy='catchup' track='guest'/>
    <timer name='xen' present='no'/>
  </clock>

How big is Qubes OS's user base?[edit]

https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-users/AqZV65yZLuU/Kib1jFLZanUJ

IP Spoofing Protection[edit]

source

AppVMs can't spoof each other in Qubes' network.

Corollary: stream isolation cannot be circumvented.

Inter-VM Networking[edit]

Current Qubes + Whonix implementation has both the Whonix-Gateway and Whonix-Workstation connected to the same backend FirewallVM and iptables forwarding is manually established between the Whonix IP addresses. This current method is really just an efficient hack for our initial Qubes + Whonix implementation. The native/proper way to network VMs in Qubes is via chaining their networking "backend" together, which is part of Xen networking structure. This is how other VMs in Qubes are networked, including TorVM. According to Qubes devs, these Xen backends provide simple point-to-point networking between VMs. So this would be advantageous for further isolation of inter-VM Whonix traffic, since, currently, all inter-VM traffic is routed through the internet-facing FirewallVM, which can also be shared by other VMs. This current implementation with a shared FirewallVM could be somewhat of a security concern for inter-VM traffic, and a reason to move to native/proper isolated point-to-point "backend" networking. Also, in the future, it is desirable to leverage full ProxyVM/ServiceVM networking between Whonix-Gateway and Whonix-Workstation, as the TorVM does. ProxyVM utilizes Xen "backend" networking but automates it with transparent Qubes GUI networking, making use of dynamically created virtual networking interfaces. Whonix may need to add onto or adjust its internal networking setup to be compatible with such native Qubes networking.

Older, perhaps outdated discussions related to this topic:

Newer discussion:

Forum Discussion[edit]

Qubes + Whonix

IP[edit]

grep -r 10.152.152.10 *[edit]

packages/anon-ws-leaktest/usr/lib/leaktest-workstation/simple_ping.py:target = "10.152.152.10"

Let's make a patch adding command line support implementing either --qubes or --ip?

packages/whonixcheck/usr/lib/whonixcheck/preparation:      GATEWAY_IP="10.152.152.10"
packages/whonixcheck/usr/lib/whonixcheck/preparation:      GATEWAY_IP="10.152.152.10"

Overruleable. These variables get only set there if they are not yet set. So they can be manipulated by using environment variables, or better by dropping a config snippet to /etc/whonix.d/40_qubes, /etc/whonix.d/40_qubes that contains: export GATEWAY_IP="<qubes-ip>"
(Make that 40_qubes_autogenerated if the file gets autogenerated.)

packages/anon-kde-streamiso/usr/share/anon-kde-streamiso/share/config/kioslaverc:socksProxy=http://10.152.152.10 9122

We could implement a package anon-kde-streamiso-qubes, that overrules anon-kde-streamiso and that gets only installed when using --qubes. (KDE config files are stackable although debuging is a bit cumbersome.) We'd just have to make sure the path to anon-kde-streamiso-qubes comes (before or after?) anon-kde-streamiso's path in the KDEDIRS envrionment variable.

Or we could install either anon-kde-streamiso or anon-kde-streamiso-qubes (--qubes) depending on which build switch is being used.

packages/anon-kde-streamiso/debian/control: settings are set, for KDE applications to socks 10.152.152.10:9122.
packages/anon-kde-streamiso/README.md:settings are set, for KDE applications to socks 10.152.152.10:9122.

Just a package description strings doing nothing. Either nevermind or rewrite the comment.

packages/whonix-base-files/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90whonix:## running on 127.0.0.1:9104 forwarding to 10.152.152.10:9104.
packages/whonix-base-files/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90whonix:## running on 127.0.0.1:9104 forwarding to 10.152.152.10:9104.
packages/whonix-base-files/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90whonix:## running on 127.0.0.1:9104 forwarding to 10.152.152.10:9104.
packages/whonix-base-files/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90whonix:#Acquire::socks::proxy "socks://10.152.152.10:9104/";

These are just comments doing nothing. We can either nevermind or rewrite the comments.

packages/whonix-ws-firewall/usr/bin/whonix_firewall:[ -n "$GATEWAY_IP" ] || GATEWAY_IP="10.152.152.10"
packages/whonix-ws-firewall/etc/whonix_firewall.d/30_default.conf:GATEWAY_IP="10.152.152.10"

Overrulable.
File: /etc/whonix_firewall.d/40_qubes
Content: GATEWAY_IP="<qubes-ip>"
Note: Keep a possible race condiation in mind. Depending on how that config snippnett is created and when whonix_firewall starts. Should the config change after whonix_firewall was already loaded, reload Whonix's firewall ("sudo whonix_firewall").

packages/anon-shared-helper-scripts/usr/lib/anon-shared-helper-scripts/tor_bootstrap_check.bsh:            TOR_CONTROL_HOST="10.152.152.10"
packages/anon-shared-helper-scripts/usr/lib/anon-shared-helper-scripts/tor_bootstrap_check.bsh:            TOR_CONTROL_HOST="10.152.152.10"

Overruleable. These variables get only set there if they are not yet set. So they can be manipulated by using environment variables, or better by dropping a config snippet to /etc/whonix.d/40_qubes, /etc/whonix.d/40_qubes and /etc/torbrowser.d/40_qubes that contains: export TOR_CONTROL_HOST="<qubes-ip>"
(Make that 40_qubes_autogenerated if the file gets autogenerated.)

packages/uwt/usr/bin/uwt:        echo "         sudo $NAME -i 10.152.152.10 -p 9104 /usr/bin/apt-get --yes dist-upgrade"

Just an output string when using "uwt -h". Not overrulable at the moment. We can either put both IPs in there. Or would it be worth sourcing the /etc/uwt.d folder to make that IP configurable? (It is also a performance question.)

packages/uwt/etc/uwt.d/30_uwt_default:      uwtwrapper_gateway_ip="10.152.152.10"

Overrulable. Create a file /etc/uwt.d/40_qubes with content: uwtwrapper_gateway_ip="<qubes-ip>".

packages/uwt/man/uwt.1.ronn:`sudo uwt -t 5 -i 10.152.152.10 -p 9104 /usr/bin/apt-get.anondist-orig --yes dist-upgrade`
packages/uwt/man/uwt.1.ronn:    uwt -t 5 -i 10.152.152.10 -p 9109 /usr/bin/wget ${1+"$@"}

Just a man page documentation string. We could modify the man page to cover both use cases.

packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:TransPort 10.152.152.10:9040
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:DnsPort 10.152.152.10:53 IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9050
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9100
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:#SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9100 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9101 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9102 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9103 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9104
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9105 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9106 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9107 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9108 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9109 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9110 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9111
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9112
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9113
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9114 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9115 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9116 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9117 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9118 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9119
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9120 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9121 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9122
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9123
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9124
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:##  127.0.0.1:9150 to 10.152.152.10:9150 [as part of the
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9150
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9152
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9153
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9154
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9155
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9156
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9157
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9158
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9159
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9160 IsolateDestAddr
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9161 IsolateDestAddr
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9162 IsolateDestAddr
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9163 IsolateDestAddr
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9164 IsolateDestAddr
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9165 IsolateDestAddr
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9166 IsolateDestAddr
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9167 IsolateDestAddr
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9168 IsolateDestAddr
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9169 IsolateDestAddr
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9170 IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9171 IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9172 IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9173 IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9174 IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9175 IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9176 IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9177 IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9178 IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9179 IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9180 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9181 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9182 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9183 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9184 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9185 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9186 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9187 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9188 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9189 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort

Not overrulable. Unfortunatly Tor does not support variables in config files. Should I (Patrick) make a feature request against Tor?

If you could use static IPs, we could fall back to use Debian packaging's patching mechanism. But that would be burdensome maintenance wise. Because there would be need for a separate qubes repository, that always has the patch applied. Or users would always have to upgrade from source code, which seems inconvenient. Or can we think of something else?

packages/tb-updater/usr/bin/update-torbrowser:      [ -n "$GATEWAY_IP" ] || GATEWAY_IP="10.152.152.10"

Overrulable. Create a file /etc/torbrowser.d/40_qubes with content: GATEWAY_IP="<qubes-ip>".

packages/whonix-legacy/debian/whonix-legacy.preinst:         sed -i 's/192.168.0.10/10.152.152.10/g' "/home/user/.torchat/torchat.ini" || true
packages/whonix-legacy/debian/whonix-legacy.preinst:         sed -i 's/192.168.0.10/10.152.152.10/g' "/home/user/.xchat2/xchat.conf" || true

No change required here. Only applies to Whonix 8.3.

packages/{{whonix-gw}}-network-conf/etc/network/interfaces.whonix:       address 10.152.152.10

TODO research: Does ifupdown support variables? If not... We have to think of something.

packages/anon-ws-dns-conf/etc/resolv.conf.anondist:nameserver 10.152.152.10

TODO research: Does /etc/resolv.conf support variables? If not... We have to think of something.

packages/anon-ws-dns-conf/debian/control: 10.152.152.10, where an Anon-Gateway is supposed to provide a DnsPort on port
packages/anon-ws-dns-conf/README.md:10.152.152.10, where an Anon-Gateway is supposed to provide a DnsPort on port

Just documentation strings. Either nevermind or patch documentation.

packages/sdwdate-plugin-anon-shared-streamiso/etc/sdwdate.d/31_anon_dist_stream_isolation_plugin:PROXY="10.152.152.10:9108"

Overrulable. Create a file /etc/sdwdate.d/40_qubes with content: PROXY="<qubes-ip>"

packages/sdwdate-plugin-anon-shared-streamiso/debian/control: Sets sdwdate's proxy settings to socks 10.152.152.10:9108.
packages/sdwdate-plugin-anon-shared-streamiso/README.md:Sets sdwdate's proxy settings to socks 10.152.152.10:9108.

Just documentation strings. Either nevermind or patch documentation.

packages/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/usr/lib/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/torbrowser.sh:##   127.0.0.1:9050 to Whonix-Gateway 10.152.152.10:9050 and
packages/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/usr/lib/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/torbrowser.sh:##   127.0.0.1:9150 to Whonix-Gateway 10.152.152.10:9150.
packages/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/usr/lib/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/torbrowser.sh:#export TOR_SOCKS_HOST="10.152.152.10"

Just documentation strings. Either nevermind or patch documentation.

packages/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/etc/rinetd.conf.anondist:127.0.0.1        9050      10.152.152.10    9050
packages/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/etc/rinetd.conf.anondist:127.0.0.1        9150      10.152.152.10    9150
packages/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/etc/rinetd.conf.anondist:127.0.0.1        11109     10.152.152.10    9119
packages/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/etc/rinetd.conf.anondist:127.0.0.1        9051      10.152.152.10    9052
packages/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/etc/rinetd.conf.anondist:127.0.0.1        9151      10.152.152.10    9052

Maybe anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor: consider replacing rinetd with rlinetd (probably not a great idea).

TODO research: does /etc/rinetd.conf support variables? If not, we have to think of something.

packages/whonix-ws-network-conf/etc/network/interfaces.whonix:       gateway 10.152.152.10

Same comment as whonix-gw-14-network-conf/etc/network/interfaces.whonix.

packages/anon-torchat/usr/share/anon-torchat/.torchat/torchat.ini:tor_server = 10.152.152.10
packages/anon-torchat/usr/share/anon-torchat/.torchat/torchat.ini:tor_server = 10.152.152.10

Probably requires a package anon-torchat-qubes that conflicts with anon-torchat that gets installed when using --qubes.

packages/xchat-improved-privacy/usr/share/xchat-improved-privacy/.xchat2/xchat.conf:# /set net_proxy_host 10.152.152.10

Just documentation strings. Either nevermind or patch documentation.

packages/xchat-improved-privacy/usr/share/xchat-improved-privacy/.xchat2/xchat.conf:net_proxy_host = 10.152.152.10

Just documentation strings. Either nevermind or patch documentation.

grep -r 10.152.152.11 *[edit]

packages/whonix-ws-firewall/usr/bin/whonix_firewall:##     From 10.152.152.11 icmp_seq=1 Destination Port Unreachable

These are just comments doing nothing. We can either nevermind or rewrite the comments.

packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/local/etc/torrc.d/50_user.conf.examples:HiddenServicePort 80 10.152.152.11:80
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/local/etc/torrc.d/50_user.conf.examples:HiddenServicePort 11009 10.152.152.11:11009
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/local/etc/torrc.d/50_user.conf.examples:HiddenServicePort 80 10.152.152.11:80

These are just comments doing nothing. We can either nevermind or rewrite the comments.

packages/whonix-legacy/debian/whonix-legacy.preinst:         sed -i 's/192.168.0.11/10.152.152.11/g' "/home/user/.torchat/torchat.ini" || true

Same comment as for packages/whonix-legacy/debian/whonix-legacy.preinst.

packages/whonix-ws-network-conf/etc/network/interfaces.whonix:       address 10.152.152.11

Same comment as for packages/whonix-gw-14-network-conf/etc/network/interfaces.whonix above.

packages/anon-torchat/usr/share/anon-torchat/.torchat/torchat.ini:listen_interface = 10.152.152.11

Same comment as for packages/anon-torchat/usr/share/anon-torchat/.torchat/torchat.ini above.

Misc[edit]

Random facts.

AdminVM is a synonym for dom0 ^[4].
AdminVM is not based on Fedora Template VM. More like a standalone VM.
Qubes Q3 RC1 AdminVM is based on Fedora 20. ^[5]
Qubes Q3 RC1 Fedora Template VM is based on Fedora 21.

Time[edit]

sudo mv /etc/qubes-rpc/qubes.SetDateTime /etc/qubes-rpc/qubes.SetDateTime.disabled

tb-updater vs TemplateVM[edit]

prerequisite knowledge[edit]

TPO stands for The Tor Project
The /home folder of a TemplateVM is copied to a TemplateBasedVM at creation time of the TemplateBasedVM. From then, TemplateBasedVM's /home folder is left untouched. (Source: https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/qubes-users/WwVJhGA-Xnc)
Tor Browser installation path in Whonix 12 will change to ~/.tb. (https://phabricator.whonix.org/T338)
Since Qubes-Whonix 11, Tor Browser gets installed by default for new images. (Not for in place upgrades.)
Tor Browser Updater (Whonix) (((https://github.com/Whonix/tb-updater))) vs
Tor Browser Internal Updater
Tor Browser Updater (Whonix) is unable to keep user settings (modifications such as bookmarks). It renames the old folder. Adds ".old.$(date)". So nothing is lost. Then installs a fresh one. Something important to know. This limitation can probably not be lifted in tb-updater. Upgrading Tor Browser is hard. (TPO often changed the folder layout in past.) That's what Tor Browser's internal updater is for.
No one has demonstrated yet, that it is possible to install & run and/or update TBB to either /usr/*, /opt/* or anything of that sort. This is because within the TBB folder, by TPO default, binaries and user data is mixed. (It is a portable application. [Portable with a meaning similar to portableapps.com. Portable on USB drives or similar. Not platform, arm + anything portable.])
By TPO default, users are supposed to have TBB in their home folder.
It is very unlikely, that TBB will be available as regular deb package anytime soon. ^[6]
A quick an dirty packaging of TBB would likely require too much maintenance effort. [Needs keeping up with upstream releases.]
Packaging TBB is further complicated, because TBB abuses Firefox's user settings mechanism for configuring anonymity related settings. (Firefox prefs) Therefore separation of binaries and user data is difficult.
Once TBB is in user's home folder... [as TPO wants it] [and it does not work otherwise]... And once the user used it... And once the user stored settings there that the user cares about... [bookmarks, etc...] It gets very difficult for the TemplateVM and/or tb-updater to keep the TBB folder up to date. That's what Tor Browser Internal Updater is for.
- Unfortunately, this means, if a user had for example 5 different Qubes-Whonix-Workstation based AppVMs where Tor Browser is in use, the user would have to update each of its 5 TBBs using Tor Browser Internal Updater.
- This is an issue, because Qubes updates are already complicated. (Various templates and dom0 needs to be updated.) This adds another layer of complexity. Users also have to care about updating stuff from within their AppVMs, which is counter intuitive.
- TBB stable has automatic updates enabled by default. ^[7]

Implementation as of Qubes-Whonix 11[edit]

As of Qubes-Whonix 11 it is confusing. Running tb-updater in the TemplateVM and restarting AppVM won't result in up to date TBB's. [Since if the TemplateVM modifies /home, this will not propagate to AppVM's /home.]

Brainstorming[edit]

Headless TBB Internal Updater Updates in AppVMs[edit]

We could call a qrexec service that starts TBB in each individual AppVM heedlessly (without / with hidden gui, using xvfb or similar) so it will be fetching updates.

up to date versions of Tor Browsers in newly created AppVMs inherited from updated TemplateVMs[edit]

ship Tor Browser tarballs in Qubes TemplateVMs in /var/cache/tb-binary and extract in AppVMs at boot time to user's home folder:
https://phabricator.whonix.org/T417

keep as is[edit]

Newly created Qubes-Whonix-Workstation AppVMs inherit the TBB version that came pre-installed in the Qubes-Whonix-Workstation TemplateVM. From there, TBB's internal updater keeps care of updating it.

Forum Discussion[edit]

UpdateVM[edit]

Moved to Next#Torified_dom0_Updates.

Upgrade through Clearnet[edit]

Qubes R3.2[edit]

Just a note about upgrading a Whonix-Gateway TemplateVM through Clearnet. Untorified! This is easily possible by setting the following environment variable.

export UWT_DEV_PASSTHROUGH="1"

Qubes R4[edit]

Undocumented.

Build[edit]

Build Single Qubes Package[edit]

Debian dev[edit]

Source: https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/qubes-devel/o6pn-kV7cU0

BACKEND_VMM=xen dpkg-buildpackage -b

Fedora rpm[edit]

Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-mgmt-salt-dom0-virtual-machines/pull/15#issuecomment-408371583

the easiest way is to use qubes-builder, you can build a single by `make mgmt-salt-dom0-virtual-machines`. Otherwise, you need to manually:

create tarball from the source dir

fill version in `.spec.in` (writing it into `.spec` file)

build it with `rpmbuild -bb <path-to-spec>`

Build Qubes-Whonix Templates[edit]

git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builder.git

(source of the following instructions)

cd qubes-builder

~/qubes-builder/builder.conf

GIT_BASEURL ?= https://github.com
GIT_PREFIX ?= QubesOS/qubes-
NO_SIGN ?= 1
VERBOSE ?= 2
BACKEND_VMM = xen
DIST_DOM0 ?= 
DISTS_VM ?= whonix-gateway whonix-workstation
USE_QUBES_REPO_VERSION ?= 4.0
USE_QUBES_REPO_TESTING ?= 1
BRANCH ?= master
COMPONENTS ?= \
              linux-template-builder \
              builder \
              builder-debian \
              template-whonix

BUILDER_PLUGINS ?= \
                   builder-debian \
                   template-whonix

GIT_URL_template_whonix = https://github.com/adrelanos/qubes-template-whonix


import-whonix-keys:
	if ! [ -d "$(KEYRING_DIR_GIT)" ]; then \
		export GNUPGHOME="$(KEYRING_DIR_GIT)"; \
		scripts/verify-git-tag; \
		gpg --keyserver pgp.mit.edu --recv-key 916B8D99C38EAF5E8ADC7A2A8D66066A2EEACCDA || exit 1; \
		echo '916B8D99C38EAF5E8ADC7A2A8D66066A2EEACCDA:6:' | gpg --import-ownertrust; \
	fi

get-sources: import-whonix-keys

make get-sources

make template

Official Builds[edit]

make DISTS_VM="whonix-gateway-14 whonix-workstation-14" template-github

Test[edit]

works as UpdateVM
can be used as ProxyVM for Fedora and Debian templates
whonixcheck (--verbose) in sys-whonix, whonix, whonix-gw-14, whonix-ws
Does qubes whonix network / firewall service run after qubes-sysinit.service? Check full systemd dependency resolution.

Qubes VM Manger Firewall Tab Settings[edit]

(screenshot)

Short:
Have no effect for Qubes-Whonix VMs. Can be ignored.

Long ^[11]:
All that settings are in separate file in the VM directory - dom0 /var/lib/qubes/appvms/whonix/firewall.xml. If the VM is running, those settings are converted to iptables syntax and loaded into QubesDB of directly connected ProxyVM. The qubes-firewall service in the ProxyVM watch for such changes and applies the rules.

I.e. in case of Whonix, the connected ProxyVM is sys-whonix. Since in Whonix qubes-firewall service is disabled (Whonix 12 ^[12]), these settings do not affect Whonix. (qubes-whonix-firewall.service is what Whonix uses.)

Qubes Upstream Bugs[edit]

Usability:

Centralized Tray Notifications

stable vs testing[edit]

Building R3 vs R3.1. Comments on which branch / config to build.

https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1318#issuecomment-147133115

Handling of file system in TemplateVMs vs TemplateBasedVMs[edit]

Qubes R3[edit]

	root	home
create new AppVM	Yes	Yes
modifications in TemmplateVMs for existing AppVMs	Yes	No

when you create a new AppVM, it inherits the TemplateVMs root and home folder
when you make changes in your TemplateVM root such as installing new packages, those will be available to existing AppVMs after TemplateVM shutdown + AppVM (re)start
when you make changes in your TemplateVM home, those will be not be available to existing AppVMs

Qubes Proposal[edit]

	root	home
create new AppVM	Yes	No
modifications in TemmplateVMs for existing AppVMs	Yes	No

Split GPG[edit]

See Dev/Split_GPG.

sys-whonix as Qubes FirewallVM[edit]

Goals:

any TemplateVM behind sys-whonix should be restricted to torified updates proxy only
Whonix TemplateVMs behind sys-whonix should be restricted to torified updates proxy only
Whonix TemplateVMs connected to a ProxyVM other than sys-whonix should refuse to connect and show a warning [done]

Qubes tickets:

Tickets:

Qubes-Whonix Whonix-Workstation TemplateVMs block access to (torified) open internet

Connection Issues[edit]

icmp mtu connection issues?

Matrix of Qubes VM Types[edit]

ProxyVM NetVM AppVM

StandaloneVM TemplateBasedVM DisposableVM

HVM HVM Template

Network in TemplateVMs[edit]

As default setting, any TemplateVM (including Whonix) in Qubes R4.0 and above have their NetVM set to none.

Networking and update of TemplateVMs is possible through Qubes Updates Proxy.

Torified Updates Proxy[edit]

sys-whonix[edit]

File /usr/share/tinyproxy/default.html gets modified. The following is the original.

<head>
<title>{errno} {cause}</title>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" />
</head>

Modified to the following.

<head>
<title>{errno} {cause}</title>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" />
<meta name="application-name" content="tor proxy"/>
</head>

Whonix TemplateVMs[edit]

Inside Whonix TemplateVMs, the following command is run will be run.

Qubes R3.2[edit]

curl_output="$(UWT_DEV_PASSTHROUGH="1" curl --silent --connect-timeout 10 "${PROXY_SERVER}")" || true

After the variables are substituted, the command actually run will be the following.

curl_output="$(UWT_DEV_PASSTHROUGH="1" curl --silent --connect-timeout 10 "http://10.137.255.254:8082/" || true

To simulate (test) this, run the following command.

UWT_DEV_PASSTHROUGH="1" curl --silent --connect-timeout 10 "http://10.137.255.254:8082/" ; echo $?

Should output the following.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.1//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml11/DTD/xhtml11.dtd">

<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">

<head>
<title>403 Filtered</title>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" />
<meta name="application-name" content="tor proxy"/>
</head>

<body>

<h1>Filtered</h1>

<p>The request you made has been filtered</p>

<hr />

<p><em>Generated by <a href="https://banu.com/tinyproxy/">tinyproxy</a> version 1.8.3.</em></p>

</body>

</html>
0

That output gets `grep`ed for PROXY_META, i.e. for.

<meta name="application-name" content="tor proxy"/>

If that matches, the whonix-secure-proxy Qubes service is activated. In other words, the /var/run/qubes-service/whonix-secure-proxy status file is being created.

Qubes R4[edit]

TODO

UWT_DEV_PASSTHROUGH="1" curl --silent --connect-timeout 10 "http://127.0.0.1:8082/"

Related[edit]

Updates Proxy Debugging[edit]

qubes-updates-proxy (and its deprecated name: qubes-yum-proxy) - a service providing a proxy for templates - by default enabled in NetVMs (especially: sys-net)
updates-proxy-setup (and its deprecated name: yum-proxy-setup) - use a proxy provided by another VM (instead of downloading updates directly), enabled by default in all templates

Troubleshooting[edit]

See Troubleshooting#Qubes_specific.

Connectivity Issues[edit]

See Troubleshooting#Qubes_specific.

bind-dirs flow chart[edit]

qubes-mount-dirs.service -> /usr/lib/qubes/init/mount-dirs.sh -> /usr/lib/qubes/bind-dirs.sh

qubes-whonix-postinit.service flow chart[edit]

qubes-whonix-postinit.service -> /usr/lib/qubes-whonix/init/qubes-whonix-postinit ->

/usr/lib/qubes-whonix/bind-directories
/usr/lib/qubes-whonix/replace-ips
enable / disable Tor through qvm-service

Qubes-Whonix 14 release testing[edit]

make sure /etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants/qubes-whonix-firewall.service is gone
sudo service qubes-whonix-firewall status
sudo service whonix-firewall status
Onion Services

lightdm autologin[edit]

sudo kate /etc/lightdm/lightdm.conf.d/user.conf

[SeatDefaults]
user-session=xfce
autologin-user=user

sudo systemctl enable lightdm

ssh into Qubes dom0[edit]

In dom0. Install socat.

sudo qubes-dom0-update socat

In dom0. Install server software.

sudo qubes-dom0-update openssh-server

sudo systemctl enable sshd

sudo systemctl start sshd

sudo systemctl status sshd

In dom0. Setup qrexec rpc.

Open /etc/qubes-rpc/local.ssh in an editor with root rights.

If you are using a graphical Whonix or Qubes-Whonix with KDE, run.

kdesudo kwrite /etc/qubes-rpc/local.ssh

kdesudo kwrite /etc/qubes-rpc/local.ssh

If you are using a graphical Whonix or Qubes-Whonix with XFCE, run.

kdesudo mousepad /etc/qubes-rpc/local.ssh

kdesudo mousepad /etc/qubes-rpc/local.ssh

If you are using a terminal-only Whonix, run.

sudo nano /etc/qubes-rpc/local.ssh

sudo nano /etc/qubes-rpc/local.ssh

Add.

#!/bin/sh
exec socat STDIO TCP-CONNECT:localhost:22

Save.

In dom0. Setup qrexec policy.

Open /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/local.ssh in an editor with root rights.

If you are using a graphical Whonix or Qubes-Whonix with KDE, run.

kdesudo kwrite /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/local.ssh

kdesudo kwrite /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/local.ssh

If you are using a graphical Whonix or Qubes-Whonix with XFCE, run.

kdesudo mousepad /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/local.ssh

kdesudo mousepad /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/local.ssh

If you are using a terminal-only Whonix, run.

sudo nano /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/local.ssh

sudo nano /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/local.ssh

Add.

sys-net dom0 allow

Save.

Start listener in server VM.

Open /rw/config/rc.local in an editor with root rights.

If you are using a graphical Whonix or Qubes-Whonix with KDE, run.

kdesudo kwrite /rw/config/rc.local

kdesudo kwrite /rw/config/rc.local

If you are using a graphical Whonix or Qubes-Whonix with XFCE, run.

kdesudo mousepad /rw/config/rc.local

kdesudo mousepad /rw/config/rc.local

If you are using a terminal-only Whonix, run.

sudo nano /rw/config/rc.local

sudo nano /rw/config/rc.local

Add only required when doing this in sys-net for servers that should be reachable directly from outside world.

iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport 22 -j ACCEPT

Add.

socat TCP-LISTEN:22,fork EXEC:"qrexec-client-vm dom0 local.ssh"

Save.

Done.

releasever[edit]

Where/how does one set $relesever?

It is a yum/dnf magic variable - version of package providing system-release.

R3.1 template package in dom0 R3.2[edit]

In UpdateVM.

sudo rm -r /var/lib/qubes/dom0-updates/*

dom0.

sudo dnf remove qubes-template-whonix-ws

dom0.

sudo qubes-dom0-update --clean qubes-template-whonix-ws-3.0.6-201612190633

R3.2: *0628 R3.1: *0633

UEFI[edit]

yubikey[edit]

yubico tested with Qubes R4 RC1.

1. Install dependencies.

In debian-8 / debian-stretch / whonix-ws TemplateVMs:

sudo apt-get install qubes-usb-proxy libu2f-host0

sudo apt-get install qubes-usb-proxy libu2f-host0

Fedora TemplateVM:

sudo dnf install qubes-usb-proxy libu2f-host

sudo dnf install qubes-usb-proxy libu2f-host

2. Shut down TemplateVMs.

3. Reboot TemplateBasedVMs that shall use the yubico.

4. Attach yubikey.

It should show up in Qubes USB systray widget. Use that to assign it to a VM that shall use the yubikey.

Otherwise run on dom0 to see if Qubes knows about it.

qvm-usb

qvm-usb

Attach. Read command usage help and use from command line.

qvm-usb attach

qvm-usb attach

5. Browser support.

For Firefox: An add-on would be required. (Untested)
Chromium (debian-stretch TemplateBased AppVM): out of the box. (Tested.)

6. Testing:

https://demo.yubico.com/u2f

7. Tested services:

Googlemail (multiple yubikey's can be added as backups)

Qubes VM debug mode[edit]

Quote Marek https://forums.whonix.org/t/whonix-live-mode/3894/36

Works only with HVM (on PVH or PV you don’t have emulated VGA). Also it enables more verbose logging - shouldn’t affect performance, but syslog in the VM may be hard to read in some cases. No other disadvantages.

See table at the bottom of https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/01/24/qsb-37-update/

VM type \ Qubes OS version         | 3.2 | 4.0-rc1-3 | 4.0-rc4 |
---------------------------------- | --- | --------- | ------- |
Default VMs without PCI devices    | PV  |    HVM    |   PVH   |

Conclusion: Qubes VM debug mode is not the way to go since in Qubes R4 the default for most VMs (that is VMs without PCI devices) (which includes Whonix) is PHV, since these don't have emulated VGA.

salt[edit]

Qubes R3.2[edit]

TODO: document

Qubes R4[edit]

This is whatsudo qubesctl state.sls qvm.anon-whonix does in effect. ^[13] It does not only do what qvm.anon-whonix does, since salt resolves dependencies. In other words, qvm.anon-whonix starts a chain reaction that includes all of the following.

install packages from qubes-templates-community
- install qubes-template-{{{{whonix-gw}}}}
- install qubes-template-whonix-ws-14

create VM called sys-whonix
- with label: black
- with 500 MB memory
- with provides_network
- enables autostart

create a VM called anon-whonix
- with label: red
- with netvm: sys-whonix
- default-dispvm: whonix-ws-dvm
- add tag anon-vm

create a VM called whonix-ws-dvm
- as DispVM Template ^[14]
- with label: red
- with netvm: sys-whonix
- default-dispvm: whonix-ws-dvm
- add tag anon-vm

dom0 config changes
- prepend /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.UpdatesProxy with the following text

whonix-ws $default allow,target=sys-whonix
whonix-ws $anyvm deny
whonix-gw-14 $default allow,target=sys-whonix
whonix-gw-14 $anyvm deny

whonix-ws $default allow,target=sys-whonix
whonix-ws $anyvm deny
whonix-gw-14 $default allow,target=sys-whonix
whonix-gw-14 $anyvm deny

- prepend /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.GetDate with

$tag:anon-vm $anyvm deny

$tag:anon-vm $anyvm deny

qvm-tags[edit]

Introduction[edit]

Qubes R4.0 and above only.

Qubes dom0 package qubes-core-admin-addon-whonix (__init__.py) (forum discussion) is responsible for:

set NetVM to sys-whonix [...]
set default DispVM set to whonix-ws-dvm [...]
set tag anon-vm
set tag anon-gateway

Qubes dom0 package qubes-mgmt-salt-dom0-virtual-machines will depend on qubes-core-admin-addon-whonix, therefore ensuring it will be installed. (T792) (#3881)

The template package qubes-whonix ships script /etc/qubes/post-install.d/30-whonix-ws.sh, which contains qvm-features-request whonix-ws=1, which is parsed by dom0 package qubes-core-agent-linux qubes RPC qubes.PostInstall.

As per Marek, qvm-features-request whonix-ws=1 should not be set by salt.

Missing Whonix tags anon-vm / anon-gateway will be added.

anon-vm tag[edit]

anon-vm gets prepended to /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.GetDate by salt template-whonix-ws.sls. Or maybe in future simpler by just adding it.

Tags are not reliably set yet. TODO: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4155 - That is something doable. But it's not a big deal for now since Qubes VMs have many ways to ask dom0 for the non-randomized time.

make sure Qubes-Whonix has no access to clocksource=xen (unlikely to be fixed anytime soon without external help) (It matters in context of Clock Correlation Attack.
set random clock offset for Qubes-Whonix VMs using mgmt to prevent clock correlation attacks
prevent dom0 telling Qubes-Whonix VMs the time by using the mgmt stack for that / disable Qubes dom0 /etc/qubes-rpc/qubes.SetDateTime

Tags will be more important in future for sdwdate-gui-qubes but that is more usability, not security.

anon-gateway tag[edit]

anon-gateway tag will be used in future by sdwdate-gui-qubes.

whonix-updatevm tag[edit]

whonix-updatevm tag gets set by salt template-whonix-ws.sls as well as by qubes-core-admin-addon-whonix __init__.py. TODO: /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.UpdatesProxy

- $tag:whonix-updatevm $default allow,target=sys-whonix
      - $tag:whonix-updatevm $anyvm deny

- $tag:whonix-updatevm $default allow,target=sys-whonix
      - $tag:whonix-updatevm $anyvm deny

view tags[edit]

tags inheritance[edit]

Tags are not inherited. Generally settings are not inherited from TemplateVM by TemplateBasedVM. Where needed, core-admin-addon can be made to copy selected settings from TemplateVM to TemplateBasedVM.

^[15]

qvm-features[edit]

To view VM features.

qvm-features {{{{whonix-gw}}}}

qvm-features {{{{whonix-gw}}}}

Should include whonix-gw-14 1.

qvm-features whonix-ws-14

qvm-features whonix-ws-14

Should include whonix-ws 1.

Connection through Qubes Updates Proxy[edit]

In Qubes TemplateVM.

R3.2[edit]

curl.anondist-orig --proxy http://10.137.255.254:8082 https://check.torproject.org

curl.anondist-orig --proxy http://10.137.255.254:8082 https://check.torproject.org

R4[edit]

curl.anondist-orig --proxy https://127.0.0.1:8082 https://check.torproject.org

curl.anondist-orig --proxy https://127.0.0.1:8082 https://check.torproject.org

Testing Automated[edit]

Footnotes[edit]

↑ Upon creation.
↑ Following shutdown.
↑ https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4175
↑ https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1015
↑ https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-users/zHdY6Oe58t0/qSFkLZdpng4J

Actually you need rpmfusion-free-release-20.noarch.rpm, as Qubes dom0 is based on Fedora 20.
↑
- Get TorBrowser in Debian
- Make a deb of the Torbrowser and add to repository
↑ https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-50-released
Starting with this release, Tor Browser will now also download and apply upgrades in the background, to ensure that users upgrade quicker and with less interaction. This behavior is governed by the about:config pref app.update.auto, but we do not recommend disabling it unless you really know what you're doing.
↑ Qubes issue ticket: Mechanism for triggering template build
↑ https://github.com/Whonix/whonix-developer-meta-files/blob/master/release/qubes-templates-offical-build-commands
↑ https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4536
↑ https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-devel/uzgN42uEJpE/hymUCMxoCwAJ
↑ https://github.com/Whonix/qubes-whonix/blob/master/lib/systemd/system/qubes-firewall.service.d/40_qubes-whonix.conf
↑ https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-mgmt-salt-dom0-virtual-machines/blob/master/qvm/
↑ template-for-dispvms: true
↑ https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-core-admin/pull/214#issuecomment-399698122

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[1] Upon creation.

[2] Following shutdown.

[3] ttps://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4175

[4] ttps://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1015

[5] ttps://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-users/zHdY6Oe58t0/qSFkLZdpng4J

Actually you need rpmfusion-free-release-20.noarch.rpm, as Qubes dom0 is based on Fedora 20.

[6] 
Get TorBrowser in Debian

Make a deb of the Torbrowser and add to repository

[7] Get TorBrowser in Debian

[8] Make a deb of the Torbrowser and add to repository

[7] ttps://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-50-released
Starting with this release, Tor Browser will now also download and apply upgrades in the background, to ensure that users upgrade quicker and with less interaction. This behavior is governed by the about:config pref app.update.auto, but we do not recommend disabling it unless you really know what you're doing.

[8] Qubes issue ticket: Mechanism for triggering template build

[9] ttps://github.com/Whonix/whonix-developer-meta-files/blob/master/release/qubes-templates-offical-build-commands

[10] ttps://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4536

[11] ttps://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-devel/uzgN42uEJpE/hymUCMxoCwAJ

[12] ttps://github.com/Whonix/qubes-whonix/blob/master/lib/systemd/system/qubes-firewall.service.d/40_qubes-whonix.conf

[13] ttps://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-mgmt-salt-dom0-virtual-machines/blob/master/qvm/

[14] template-for-dispvms: true

[15] ttps://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-core-admin/pull/214#issuecomment-399698122

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Dev/Qubes

< Dev(Redirected from Dev/Qubes OS)

Contents

Qubes Persistence[edit]

Debian Template[edit]

bind-dirs vs Tor[edit]

Config Files Changes[edit]

IPs[edit]

Tor Browser[edit]

Run updates over Proxy/Tor[edit]

Time Sync[edit]

Introduction[edit]

Instructions[edit]

How big is Qubes OS's user base?[edit]

IP Spoofing Protection[edit]

Inter-VM Networking[edit]

Forum Discussion[edit]

IP[edit]

grep -r 10.152.152.10 *[edit]

grep -r 10.152.152.11 *[edit]

Misc[edit]

Time[edit]

tb-updater vs TemplateVM[edit]

prerequisite knowledge[edit]

Implementation as of Qubes-Whonix 11[edit]

Brainstorming[edit]

Headless TBB Internal Updater Updates in AppVMs[edit]

up to date versions of Tor Browsers in newly created AppVMs inherited from updated TemplateVMs[edit]

keep as is[edit]

Forum Discussion[edit]

UpdateVM[edit]

Upgrade through Clearnet[edit]

Qubes R3.2[edit]

Qubes R4[edit]

Build[edit]

Build Single Qubes Package[edit]

Debian dev[edit]

Fedora rpm[edit]

Build Qubes-Whonix Templates[edit]

Official Builds[edit]

Test[edit]

Qubes VM Manger Firewall Tab Settings[edit]

Qubes Upstream Bugs[edit]

stable vs testing[edit]

Handling of file system in TemplateVMs vs TemplateBasedVMs[edit]

Qubes R3[edit]

Qubes Proposal[edit]

Split GPG[edit]

sys-whonix as Qubes FirewallVM[edit]

Connection Issues[edit]

Matrix of Qubes VM Types[edit]

Network in TemplateVMs[edit]

Torified Updates Proxy[edit]

sys-whonix[edit]

Whonix TemplateVMs[edit]

Qubes R3.2[edit]

Qubes R4[edit]

Related[edit]

Updates Proxy Debugging[edit]

Troubleshooting[edit]

Connectivity Issues[edit]

bind-dirs flow chart[edit]

qubes-whonix-postinit.service flow chart[edit]

Qubes-Whonix 14 release testing[edit]

lightdm autologin[edit]

ssh into Qubes dom0[edit]

releasever[edit]

R3.1 template package in dom0 R3.2[edit]

UEFI[edit]

yubikey[edit]

Qubes VM debug mode[edit]

salt[edit]

Qubes R3.2[edit]

Qubes R4[edit]

qvm-tags[edit]

Introduction[edit]

anon-vm tag[edit]

anon-gateway tag[edit]

whonix-updatevm tag[edit]

view tags[edit]