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Qubes-Whonix development notes.

Issues

Important Issues

Important Networking Issues

• change Qubes network policy, UpdatesProxy to network disabled by default for better leak-proofness #3994
• disallow setting netvm of whonix-ws to a non whonix-gw
• self-contained Qubes templates including meta scripts (salt) / improve Qubes-Whonix installation usability
• Absence of add UpdateVM setting to qubes-vm-settings feature leads to user confusion which VM will be used as UpdateVM.
• Qubes-Whonix Security Disadvantages
• sys-net phones home to fedoraproject.org for captive portal detection #1814 - Qubes openQA test missing
• document how to route all traffic over Tor / how to disable Qubes default clearnet traffic #7586
• Qubes should keep IP forwarding in VMs with the provides network (Net Qube) disabled by default #7801

Important Security Disadvantages

• Qubes-Whonix Security Disadvantages - Help Wanted!

Important General Issues

• Qubes Updater Issues, Qubes Updater Issues, most notably such as:
  • qubes-dom0-update shows No updates available in case of network is down / qubes-dom0-update fails to notice if repositories are unreachable / network is down,
  • Updating via Salt falsely claims to succeed when it actually fails and
  • Replace built-in Qube Manager update functionality with the Qubes Update tool
  • qubes-dom0-update - dom0 package updates are downloaded but not installed
• Tor Browser default screen resolution different between Qubes Debian & Whonix templates versus plain Debian
• Ensure Qubes firewall loads at the right time during VM boot
• RELATED,ESTABLISHED -> ESTABLISHED linux kernel hardening
• unprivilege the CPU's random number generator (RDRAND) / set kernel parameter "random.trust_cpu=off"

Usability Issues

• Switching qube to Whonix template fails to add anon-vm qvm-tag, resulting in sys-whonix: denied: denied by policy
• Kicksecure inside Debian Template sdwdate qrexec Denied message

Practicality Issues

• Installer parses and modifies pre-existing partitions even if given disk is not selected for installation #2835
• Qubes Initial Setup impossible to debug
• qvm-backup-restore fails with scrypt: Input is not valid scrypt-encrypted block
• Qubes R4 after upgrades boot process stuck at "Reached Target Basic System"

More Issues

• make Linux Kernel Runtime Guard (LKRG) easily available in Qubes
• avoid installation of unnecessary packages / clean up packages_ in Debian based templates
• fix Qubes source code copyright / licensing declaration, machine readable copyright, use SPDX License Identifier
• qrexec feature request: send this over qrexec to the NetVM I am connected to / sys-whonix hardcoded / sys-whonix unexpected autostart

More Reported Issues

• https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/created_by/adrelanos?page=2&q=is%3Aopen+is%3Aissue+author%3Aadrelanos

Backup Issues

• backup horror story: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/7567#issuecomment-1257732586
• https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/7809
• https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3498
• https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/6386
• https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/7797

issue reports:

• https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/backup-qubes-failing-write-error-read-only-file-system/2926

Info

https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4794#issuecomment-466721775

Can somehow the number of the VM vm80 be used to deduce the VM name so I can check/try again?

it is QID, try qvm-ls -O name,qid

Write Qubes ISO Installer Image to USB

When using an App Qube such as iso-download.

Syntax:

pv < /path/to/iso > /path/to/linux/device

Example:

pv < Qubes-R4.1.0-x86_64.iso > /dev/xvdi

Qubes Initial Setup Debugging

What is the Qubes Initial Setup? See this:

• https://www.qubes-os.org/attachment/doc/initial-setup-menu.png
• https://www.qubes-os.org/attachment/doc/initial-setup-menu-configuration.png

/usr/libexec/initial-setup/initial-setup-graphical

source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/7244#issuecomment-1035516089

Qubes Persistence

Table: Qubes R4 Inheritance and Persistence

	Inheritance	Persistence
Template	n/a	Everything
App Qubes	/etc/skel/ to /home/	/rw/ (includes /home/ and bind-dirs)
Disposable Template	/etc/skel/ to /home/	/rw/ (includes /home/, /usr/local and bind-dirs)
Disposable	/rw/ (includes /home/, /usr/local and bind-dirs)	Nothing

Debian Template

https://groups.google.com/g/qubes-devel/c/EBxvtMlwp5k

bind-dirs vs Tor

Does bind-dirs will be run before /lib/systemd/system/tor@default.service?

Yes.

qubes-mount-dirs.service has Before=local-fs.target, which it ordered before sysinit.target. After=sysinit.target in turns is included by default (unless DefaultDependencies=noDefaultDependencies=no).

Config Files Changes

source

I don't know how rpm packaging works. However, the TorVM rpm packaging seems simpler to me and introduce less overhead than Debian packaging at first view. Is there something like config-package-dev for Fedora? config-package-dev is a package to overtake ownership of other > package's files. Such as, in Debian the Tor package owns /usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc. Whonix needs to modify that file and keep it updated. config-package-dev can be used to avoid getting the file being overwritten when upstream releases and upgrade. Is there something like this for Fedora or is this even required? That would make a port much simpler, because for many parts, it is just diverted config files.

qubes-tor pacakages provides own config file (tor --defaults-torrc option used), so no need to override the one provided by tor package.

But to answer your question - no, rpm do not have option to take ownership of files from other packages, but to workaround this (rather sensible) limitation you can modify the config in triggers (so the file will be modified after each original package update).

IPs

source

Qubes uses non-fixed LAN IPs? How do internal LAN IPs get assigned to TorVM / AppVMs?

QubesVm IP address is generated based on its netvm ID (subnet number) and the said VM static ID, so unless user is switching netvm, the IP is pretty static. We've chosen 10.137.<subnet-id>.<vm-id> which is quite exotic so conflicts with real LAN are very rare (even if rather harmless in isolated network).

Tor Browser

source

In your Torless TBB launcher script for use with Qubes' transparent Tor proxy, TOR_SOCKS_HOST=10.137.3.1. Is this supposed to be the same for all Qubes machines regardless of how many ProxyVMs users have created (or other user settings)? Or is the user supposed to change this before using the script?

Perhaps it is good idea to add some firewall rule in TorVM to redirect traffic to any 10.137.0.0/16 IP + port 9050/9049 to the tor running in TorVM. This way AnonVM can use any IP as a sock proxy address.

Run updates over Proxy/Tor

source

Without wasting a lot space, having lots of standalone VMs... How could one persistently install software in QubesOS using package managers over Tor just for a specific VM? Routing all traffic over Tor is also an option, but not a ideal one either (having some clearnet traffic is better for various reasons).

Set TorVM as netvm for the template. By default template updates are routed via "update proxy" (simple http proxy, which allow access only to yum-repository-like sites). This proxy is running in netvm, so after TorVM. Because of that its you need to disable 'yum-proxy-setup' service for this template and allow some traffic in the firewall settings. Or enable 'qubes-yum-proxy' service in TorVM and ensure that its traffic goes through tor.

Time Sync

Introduction

Discussion about insecurity of NTP:
https://groups.google.com/g/qubes-devel/c/YHK_rAUm0s0/m/ARrBPHrf0fkJ

source

Can Qubes OS leave VM's clocks untouched and keep time sync to the VM or is there some forced-VM-timesync-with-dom-0 that can not be turned off? In that case, that would be a bad.

Currently time synchronization is done in some silly way: qvm-sync-clock called each 6min from dom0 cron. That tool fetch the current time using ntpdate in netvm (VM set as clockvm in qubes-prefs), then pass the result to 'date -s' in each VM.

You can disable this mechanism globally by unsetting(*) clockvm (qubes-prefs -s clockvm none).

(*) Which apparently was broken, fix will be included in updates soon.

Instructions

UNTESTED!

Install a comfortable editor (optional!).

sudo qubes-dom0-update kate

Edit your VM settings. (Feel free to drop 'EDITOR=kate' and/or to use an editor of your choice.)

sudo EDITOR=kate virsh edit whonix-ws

Find the following block.

<clock offset='utc' adjustment='reset'>
   <timer name='tsc' mode='native'/>
</clock>

Replace it with the following.

  <clock offset='utc'>
    <timer name='rtc' tickpolicy='catchup' track='guest'/>
    <timer name='xen' present='no'/>
  </clock>

How big is Qubes OS's user base?

https://groups.google.com/g/qubes-users/c/AqZV65yZLuU/m/Kib1jFLZanUJ

IP Spoofing Protection

source

AppVMs can't spoof each other in Qubes' network.

Corollary: stream isolation cannot be circumvented.

Inter-VM Networking

Current Qubes + Whonix implementation has both the Whonix-Gateway and Whonix-Workstation connected to the same backend FirewallVM and iptables forwarding is manually established between the Whonix IP addresses. This current method is really just an efficient hack for our initial Qubes + Whonix implementation. The native/proper way to network VMs in Qubes is via chaining their networking "backend" together, which is part of Xen networking structure. This is how other VMs in Qubes are networked, including TorVM. According to Qubes devs, these Xen backends provide simple point-to-point networking between VMs. So this would be advantageous for further isolation of inter-VM Whonix traffic, since, currently, all inter-VM traffic is routed through the internet-facing FirewallVM, which can also be shared by other VMs. This current implementation with a shared FirewallVM could be somewhat of a security concern for inter-VM traffic, and a reason to move to native/proper isolated point-to-point "backend" networking. Also, in the future, it is desirable to leverage full ProxyVM/ServiceVM networking between Whonix-Gateway and Whonix-Workstation, as the TorVM does. ProxyVM utilizes Xen "backend" networking but automates it with transparent Qubes GUI networking, making use of dynamically created virtual networking interfaces. Whonix may need to add onto or adjust its internal networking setup to be compatible with such native Qubes networking.

Older, perhaps outdated discussions related to this topic:

• https://groups.google.com/g/qubes-users/c/RFXoZ3zt-PE
• https://groups.google.com/g/qubes-users/c/GhgWH5mHf2E/m/0LU35M6GPecJ
• https://groups.google.com/g/qubes-users/c/GhgWH5mHf2E/m/96odaNoBVRwJ

Newer discussion:

• https://forums.whonix.org/t/multiple-whonix-workstations-that-can-communicate-with-each-other
• https://tor.stackexchange.com/questions/13522/how-to-configure-whonix-gateway-for-communication-between-two-local-workstations/13546#13546

IP

grep -r 10.152.152.10 *

packages/anon-ws-leaktest/usr/lib/leaktest-workstation/simple_ping.py:target = "10.152.152.10"

Let's make a patch adding command line support implementing either --qubes or --ip?

packages/systemcheck/usr/libexec/systemcheck/preparation:      GATEWAY_IP="10.152.152.10"
packages/systemcheck/usr/libexec/systemcheck/preparation:      GATEWAY_IP="10.152.152.10"

Overruleable. These variables get only set there if they are not yet set. So they can be manipulated by using environment variables, or better by dropping a config snippet to /etc/systemcheck.d/40_qubes, /etc/systemcheck.d/40_qubes that contains: export GATEWAY_IP="<qubes-ip>"
(Make that 40_qubes_autogenerated if the file gets autogenerated.)

packages/anon-kde-streamiso/usr/share/anon-kde-streamiso/share/config/kioslaverc:socksProxy=http://10.152.152.10 9122

We could implement a package anon-kde-streamiso-qubes, that overrules anon-kde-streamiso and that gets only installed when using --qubes. (KDE config files are stackable although debuging is a bit cumbersome.) We'd just have to make sure the path to anon-kde-streamiso-qubes comes (before or after?) anon-kde-streamiso's path in the KDEDIRS envrionment variable.

Or we could install either anon-kde-streamiso or anon-kde-streamiso-qubes (--qubes) depending on which build switch is being used.

packages/anon-kde-streamiso/debian/control: settings are set, for KDE applications to socks 10.152.152.10:9122.
packages/anon-kde-streamiso/README.md:settings are set, for KDE applications to socks 10.152.152.10:9122.

Just a package description strings doing nothing. Either nevermind or rewrite the comment.

packages/whonix-base-files/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90whonix:## running on 127.0.0.1:9104 forwarding to 10.152.152.10:9104.
packages/whonix-base-files/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90whonix:## running on 127.0.0.1:9104 forwarding to 10.152.152.10:9104.
packages/whonix-base-files/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90whonix:## running on 127.0.0.1:9104 forwarding to 10.152.152.10:9104.
packages/whonix-base-files/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90whonix:#Acquire::socks::proxy "socks://10.152.152.10:9104/";

These are just comments doing nothing. We can either nevermind or rewrite the comments.

packages/whonix-ws-firewall/usr/bin/whonix_firewall:[ -n "$GATEWAY_IP" ] || GATEWAY_IP="10.152.152.10"
packages/whonix-ws-firewall/etc/whonix_firewall.d/30_default.conf:GATEWAY_IP="10.152.152.10"

Overrulable.
File: /etc/whonix_firewall.d/40_qubes
Content: GATEWAY_IP="<qubes-ip>"
Note: Keep a possible race condiation in mind. Depending on how that config snippnett is created and when whonix_firewall starts. Should the config change after whonix_firewall was already loaded, reload Whonix firewall ("sudo whonix_firewall").

packages/helper-scripts/usr/lib/helper-scripts/tor_bootstrap_check.bsh:            TOR_CONTROL_HOST="10.152.152.10"
packages/helper-scripts/usr/lib/helper-scripts/tor_bootstrap_check.bsh:            TOR_CONTROL_HOST="10.152.152.10"

Overruleable. These variables get only set there if they are not yet set. So they can be manipulated by using environment variables, or better by dropping a config snippet to /etc/systemcheck.d/40_qubes, /etc/systemcheck.d/40_qubes and /etc/torbrowser.d/40_qubes that contains: export TOR_CONTROL_HOST="<qubes-ip>"
(Make that 40_qubes_autogenerated if the file gets autogenerated.)

packages/uwt/usr/bin/uwt:        echo "         sudo $NAME -i 10.152.152.10 -p 9104 /usr/bin/apt --yes full-upgrade"

Just an output string when using "uwt -h". Not overrulable at the moment. We can either put both IPs in there. Or would it be worth sourcing the /etc/uwt.d folder to make that IP configurable? (It is also a performance question.)

packages/uwt/etc/uwt.d/30_uwt_default:      uwtwrapper_gateway_ip="10.152.152.10"

Overrulable. Create a file /etc/uwt.d/40_qubes with content: uwtwrapper_gateway_ip="<qubes-ip>".

packages/uwt/man/uwt.1.ronn:`sudo uwt -t 5 -i 10.152.152.10 -p 9104 /usr/bin/apt-get.anondist-orig --yes full-upgrade`
packages/uwt/man/uwt.1.ronn:    uwt -t 5 -i 10.152.152.10 -p 9109 /usr/bin/wget ${1+"$@"}

Just a man page documentation string. We could modify the man page to cover both use cases.

packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:TransPort 10.152.152.10:9040
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:DnsPort 10.152.152.10:53 IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9050
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9100
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:#SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9100 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9101 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9102 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9103 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9104
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9105 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9106 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9107 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9108 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9109 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9110 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9111
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9112
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9113
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9114 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9115 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9116 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9117 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9118 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9119
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9120 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9121 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9122
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9123
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9124
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:##  127.0.0.1:9150 to 10.152.152.10:9150 [as part of the
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9150
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9152
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9153
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9154
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9155
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9156
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9157
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9158
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9159
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9160 IsolateDestAddr
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9161 IsolateDestAddr
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9162 IsolateDestAddr
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9163 IsolateDestAddr
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9164 IsolateDestAddr
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9165 IsolateDestAddr
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9166 IsolateDestAddr
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9167 IsolateDestAddr
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9168 IsolateDestAddr
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9169 IsolateDestAddr
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9170 IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9171 IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9172 IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9173 IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9174 IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9175 IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9176 IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9177 IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9178 IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9179 IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9180 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9181 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9182 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9183 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9184 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9185 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9186 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9187 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9188 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc.anondist:SocksPort 10.152.152.10:9189 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort

Not overrulable. Unfortunatly Tor does not support variables in config files. Should I (Patrick) make a feature request against Tor?

If you could use static IPs, we could fall back to use Debian packaging's patching mechanism. But that would be burdensome maintenance wise. Because there would be need for a separate qubes repository, that always has the patch applied. Or users would always have to upgrade from source code, which seems inconvenient. Or can we think of something else?

packages/tb-updater/usr/bin/update-torbrowser:      [ -n "$GATEWAY_IP" ] || GATEWAY_IP="10.152.152.10"

Overrulable. Create a file /etc/torbrowser.d/40_qubes with content: GATEWAY_IP="<qubes-ip>".

packages/whonix-legacy/debian/whonix-legacy.preinst:         sed -i 's/192.168.0.10/10.152.152.10/g' "/home/user/.torchat/torchat.ini" || true
packages/whonix-legacy/debian/whonix-legacy.preinst:         sed -i 's/192.168.0.10/10.152.152.10/g' "/home/user/.xchat2/xchat.conf" || true

No change required here. Only applies to Whonix 8.3.

packages/{{project_name_gateway_template}}-network-conf/etc/network/interfaces.whonix:       address 10.152.152.10

TODO research: Does ifupdown support variables? If not... We have to think of something.

packages/anon-ws-dns-conf/etc/resolv.conf.anondist:nameserver 10.152.152.10

TODO research: Does /etc/resolv.conf support variables? If not... We have to think of something.

packages/anon-ws-dns-conf/debian/control: 10.152.152.10, where an Anon-Gateway is supposed to provide a DnsPort on port
packages/anon-ws-dns-conf/README.md:10.152.152.10, where an Anon-Gateway is supposed to provide a DnsPort on port

Just documentation strings. Either nevermind or patch documentation.

packages/sdwdate-plugin-anon-shared-streamiso/etc/sdwdate.d/31_anon_dist_stream_isolation_plugin:PROXY="10.152.152.10:9108"

Overrulable. Create a file /etc/sdwdate.d/40_qubes with content: PROXY="<qubes-ip>"

packages/sdwdate-plugin-anon-shared-streamiso/debian/control: Sets sdwdate's proxy settings to socks 10.152.152.10:9108.
packages/sdwdate-plugin-anon-shared-streamiso/README.md:Sets sdwdate's proxy settings to socks 10.152.152.10:9108.

Just documentation strings. Either nevermind or patch documentation.

packages/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/usr/lib/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/torbrowser.sh:##   127.0.0.1:9050 to {{project_name_gateway_long}} 10.152.152.10:9050 and
packages/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/usr/lib/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/torbrowser.sh:##   127.0.0.1:9150 to {{project_name_gateway_long}} 10.152.152.10:9150.
packages/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/usr/lib/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/torbrowser.sh:#export TOR_SOCKS_HOST="10.152.152.10"

Just documentation strings. Either nevermind or patch documentation.

packages/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/etc/rinetd.conf.anondist:127.0.0.1        9050      10.152.152.10    9050
packages/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/etc/rinetd.conf.anondist:127.0.0.1        9150      10.152.152.10    9150
packages/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/etc/rinetd.conf.anondist:127.0.0.1        11109     10.152.152.10    9119
packages/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/etc/rinetd.conf.anondist:127.0.0.1        9051      10.152.152.10    9052
packages/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/etc/rinetd.conf.anondist:127.0.0.1        9151      10.152.152.10    9052

packages/whonix-ws-network-conf/etc/network/interfaces.whonix:       gateway 10.152.152.10

Same comment as whonix-gateway-17-network-conf/etc/network/interfaces.whonix.

packages/anon-torchat/usr/share/anon-torchat/.torchat/torchat.ini:tor_server = 10.152.152.10
packages/anon-torchat/usr/share/anon-torchat/.torchat/torchat.ini:tor_server = 10.152.152.10

Probably requires a package anon-torchat-qubes that conflicts with anon-torchat that gets installed when using --qubes.

packages/xchat-improved-privacy/usr/share/xchat-improved-privacy/.xchat2/xchat.conf:# /set net_proxy_host 10.152.152.10

Just documentation strings. Either nevermind or patch documentation.

packages/xchat-improved-privacy/usr/share/xchat-improved-privacy/.xchat2/xchat.conf:net_proxy_host = 10.152.152.10

Just documentation strings. Either nevermind or patch documentation.

grep -r 10.152.152.11 *

packages/whonix-ws-firewall/usr/bin/whonix_firewall:##     From 10.152.152.11 icmp_seq=1 Destination Port Unreachable

These are just comments doing nothing. We can either nevermind or rewrite the comments.

packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/local/etc/torrc.d/50_user.conf.examples:HiddenServicePort 80 10.152.152.11:80
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/local/etc/torrc.d/50_user.conf.examples:HiddenServicePort 11009 10.152.152.11:11009
packages/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/usr/local/etc/torrc.d/50_user.conf.examples:HiddenServicePort 80 10.152.152.11:80

These are just comments doing nothing. We can either nevermind or rewrite the comments.

packages/whonix-legacy/debian/whonix-legacy.preinst:         sed -i 's/192.168.0.11/10.152.152.11/g' "/home/user/.torchat/torchat.ini" || true

Same comment as for packages/whonix-legacy/debian/whonix-legacy.preinst.

packages/whonix-ws-network-conf/etc/network/interfaces.whonix:       address 10.152.152.11

Same comment as for packages/whonix-gateway-17-network-conf/etc/network/interfaces.whonix above.

packages/anon-torchat/usr/share/anon-torchat/.torchat/torchat.ini:listen_interface = 10.152.152.11

Same comment as for packages/anon-torchat/usr/share/anon-torchat/.torchat/torchat.ini above.

Time

sudo mv /etc/qubes-rpc/qubes.SetDateTime /etc/qubes-rpc/qubes.SetDateTime.disabled

tb-updater vs Template

prerequisite knowledge

• TPO stands for The Tor Project
• The /home folder of a Template is copied to a TemplateBasedVM at creation time of the TemplateBasedVM. From then, TemplateBasedVM's /home folder is left untouched. (Source: https://groups.google.com/g/qubes-users/c/WwVJhGA-Xnc)
• Tor Browser installation path in Whonix 12 will change to ~/.tb. (https://phabricator.whonix.org/T338)
• Since Qubes-Whonix 11, Tor Browser gets installed by default for new images. (Not for in place upgrades.)
• https://github.com/Kicksecure/tb-updater vs
• Tor Browser Internal Updater
• Tor Browser Updater (Whonix) is unable to keep user settings (modifications such as bookmarks). It renames the old folder. Adds ".old.$(date)". So nothing is lost. Then installs a fresh one. Something important to know. This limitation can probably not be lifted in tb-updater. Upgrading Tor Browser is hard. (TPO often changed the folder layout in past.) That's what Tor Browser's internal updater is for.
• No one has demonstrated yet, that it is possible to install & run and/or update TBB to either /usr/*, /opt/* or anything of that sort. This is because within the TBB folder, by TPO default, binaries and user data is mixed. (It is a portable application. [Portable with a meaning similar to portableapps.com. Portable on USB drives or similar. Not platform, arm + anything portable.])
• By TPO default, users are supposed to have TBB in their home folder.
• It is very unlikely, that TBB will be available as regular deb package anytime soon.
• A quick an dirty packaging of TBB would likely require too much maintenance effort. [Needs keeping up with upstream releases.]
• Packaging TBB is further complicated, because TBB abuses Firefox's user settings mechanism for configuring anonymity related settings. (Firefox prefs) Therefore separation of binaries and user data is difficult.
• Once TBB is in user's home folder... [as TPO wants it] [and it does not work otherwise]... And once the user used it... And once the user stored settings there that the user cares about... [bookmarks, etc...] It gets very difficult for the Template and/or tb-updater to keep the TBB folder up to date. That's what Tor Browser Internal Updater is for.
  • Unfortunately, this means, if a user had for example 5 different Qubes-Whonix-Workstation based AppVMs where Tor Browser is in use, the user would have to update each of its 5 TBBs using Tor Browser Internal Updater.
  • This is an issue, because Qubes updates are already complicated. (Various templates and dom0 needs to be updated.) This adds another layer of complexity. Users also have to care about updating stuff from within their AppVMs, which is counter intuitive.
  • TBB stable has automatic updates enabled by default.

Implementation as of Qubes-Whonix 11

• As of Qubes-Whonix 11 it is confusing. Running tb-updater in the Template and restarting AppVM won't result in up to date TBB's. [Since if the Template modifies /home, this will not propagate to AppVM's /home.]

Brainstorming

Headless TBB Internal Updater Updates in AppVMs

We could call a qrexec service that starts TBB in each individual AppVM heedlessly (without / with hidden gui, using xvfb or similar) so it will be fetching updates.

up to date versions of Tor Browsers in newly created AppVMs inherited from updated Templates

ship Tor Browser tarballs in Qubes Templates in /var/cache/tb-binary and extract in AppVMs at boot time to user's home folder:
https://phabricator.whonix.org/T417

keep as is

Newly created Qubes-Whonix-Workstation AppVMs inherit the TBB version that came pre-installed in the Qubes-Whonix-Workstation Template. From there, TBB's internal updater keeps care of updating it.

Forum Discussion

• https://forums.whonix.org/t/what-should-tor-browser-updater-whonix-do-in-a-templatevm
• https://forums.whonix.org/t/idea-for-aqrexec-service-to-install-new-versions-of-tor-browser-to-a-list-of-vms

Build

Build Single Qubes Package

Debian dev

Source: https://groups.google.com/g/qubes-devel/c/o6pn-kV7cU0

BACKEND_VMM=xen dpkg-buildpackage -b

Fedora rpm

Source: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-mgmt-salt-dom0-virtual-machines/pull/15#issuecomment-408371583

the easiest way is to use qubes-builder, you can build a single by `make mgmt-salt-dom0-virtual-machines`. Otherwise, you need to manually:

• create tarball from the source dir
• fill version in `.spec.in` (writing it into `.spec` file)
• build it with `rpmbuild -bb <path-to-spec>`

Build Qubes-Whonix Templates

git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builder.git

(source of the following instructions)

cd qubes-builder

~/qubes-builder/builder.conf

GIT_BASEURL ?= https://github.com
GIT_PREFIX ?= QubesOS/qubes-
NO_SIGN ?= 1
VERBOSE ?= 2
BACKEND_VMM = xen
DIST_DOM0 ?=
DISTS_VM ?= whonix-gateway whonix-workstation
USE_QUBES_REPO_VERSION ?= 4.0
USE_QUBES_REPO_TESTING ?= 1
BRANCH ?= master
COMPONENTS ?= \
              linux-template-builder \
              builder \
              builder-debian \
              template-whonix

BUILDER_PLUGINS ?= \
                   builder-debian \
                   template-whonix

GIT_URL_template_whonix = https://github.com/Whonix/qubes-template-whonix


import-whonix-keys:
	if ! [ -d "$(KEYRING_DIR_GIT)" ]; then \
		export GNUPGHOME="$(KEYRING_DIR_GIT)"; \
		scripts/verify-git-tag; \
		gpg --keyserver keys.openpgp.org --recv-key 916B8D99C38EAF5E8ADC7A2A8D66066A2EEACCDA || exit 1; \
		echo '916B8D99C38EAF5E8ADC7A2A8D66066A2EEACCDA:6:' | gpg --import-ownertrust; \
	fi

get-sources: import-whonix-keys

make get-sources

make template

Official Builds

builder.conf:

SIGN_KEY = 916B8D99C38EAF5E8ADC7A2A8D66066A2EEACCDA
GITHUB_BUILD_TARGET = /repos/QubesOS/updates-status/issues/566/comments
# https://github.com/settings/tokens
GITHUB_API_KEY = replace-this
# And if you use splig-gpg:
GNUPG = qubes-gpg-client

• build command format
• Place for build template commands
• https://github.com/QubesOS/updates-status/issues
• https://github.com/QubesOS/build-issues/issues
• https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-template-configs/blob/master/R4.0/templates-community/whonix-16.conf
• https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-template-configs/blob/master/R4.2/templates-community/whonix-17.conf
• Run from qubes-builder source folder:

Whonix 16:

RELEASE=4.1 REPO_PROXY="" make DISTS_VM="whonix-gateway-16 whonix-workstation-16" template-github

Whonix 17:

RELEASE=4.2 REPO_PROXY="" make DISTS_VM="whonix-gateway-17 whonix-workstation-17" template-github

Test

• works as UpdateVM
• can be used as ProxyVM for Fedora and Debian templates
• systemcheck (--verbose) in sys-whonix, whonix, whonix-gateway-17, whonix-ws
• Does qubes Whonix network / firewall service run after qubes-sysinit.service? Check full systemd dependency resolution.

Qubes VM Manger Firewall Tab Settings

(screenshot)

Short:
Have no effect for Qubes-Whonix VMs. Can be ignored.

Long :
All that settings are in separate file in the VM directory - dom0 /var/lib/qubes/appvms/whonix/firewall.xml. If the VM is running, those settings are converted to iptables syntax and loaded into QubesDB of directly connected ProxyVM. The qubes-firewall service in the ProxyVM watch for such changes and applies the rules.

I.e. in case of Whonix, the connected ProxyVM is sys-whonix. Since in Whonix qubes-firewall service is disabled (Whonix 12 ), these settings do not affect Whonix. (qubes-whonix-firewall.service is what Whonix uses.)

Qubes Upstream Bugs

Usability:

• Centralized Tray Notifications

stable vs testing

Building R3 vs R3.1. Comments on which branch / config to build.

https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1318#issuecomment-147133115

Split GPG

See Dev/Split_GPG.

sys-whonix as Qubes FirewallVM

Goals:

• any Template behind sys-whonix should be restricted to torified UpdatesProxy only
• Whonix Templates behind sys-whonix should be restricted to torified UpdatesProxy only
• Whonix Templates connected to a ProxyVM other than sys-whonix should refuse to connect and show a warning [done]

Qubes tickets:

• Implement new firewall dom0→VM interface
• mechanism to hide Qubes VM Manager 'Firewall rules' tab
• Template policy, services→features, core plugins

Tickets:

• Qubes-Whonix Whonix-Workstation Templates block access to (torified) open internet

Connection Issues

• icmp mtu connection issues?
• Template upgrade issues? -> https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/8388

Matrix of Qubes VM Types

ProxyVM NetVM AppVM

StandaloneVM TemplateBasedVM Disposable

HVM HVM Template

Network in Templates

As default setting, any Template (including Whonix) in Qubes R4.0 and above have their NetVM set to none.

Networking and update of Templates is possible through Qubes UpdatesProxy.

Torified UpdatesProxy

Connection through Qubes UpdatesProxy

In Qubes Template.

http_proxy=http://127.0.0.1:8082 https_proxy=http://127.0.0.1:8082 curl.anondist-orig https://check.torproject.org

sys-whonix

File /usr/share/tinyproxy/default.html gets modified. The following is the original.

<head>
<title>{errno} {cause}</title>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" />
</head>

Modified to the following.

<head>
<title>{errno} {cause}</title>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" />
<meta name="application-name" content="tor proxy"/>
</head>

Whonix Templates

Inside Whonix Templates, the following command is run will be run.

Qubes R3.2

curl_output="$(UWT_DEV_PASSTHROUGH="1" curl --silent --connect-timeout 10 "${PROXY_SERVER}")" || true

After the variables are substituted, the command actually run will be the following.

curl_output="$(UWT_DEV_PASSTHROUGH="1" curl --silent --connect-timeout 10 "http://10.137.255.254:8082/" || true

To simulate (test) this, run the following command.

UWT_DEV_PASSTHROUGH="1" curl --silent --connect-timeout 10 "http://10.137.255.254:8082/" ; echo $?

Should output the following.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.1//EN" "https://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml11/DTD/xhtml11.dtd">

<html xmlns="https://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml/" xml:lang="en">

<head>
<title>403 Filtered</title>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" />
<meta name="application-name" content="tor proxy"/>
</head>

<body>

<h1>Filtered</h1>

<p>The request you made has been filtered</p>

<hr />

<p><em>Generated by <a href="https://banu.com/tinyproxy/">tinyproxy</a> version 1.8.3.</em></p>

</body>

</html>
0

That output gets `grep`ed for PROXY_META, i.e. for.

<meta name="application-name" content="tor proxy"/>

If that matches, the whonix-secure-proxy Qubes service is activated. In other words, the /var/run/qubes-service/whonix-secure-proxy status file is being created.

Qubes R4

TODO

UWT_DEV_PASSTHROUGH="1" curl --silent --connect-timeout 10 "http://127.0.0.1:8082/"

Related

• Cache updates #1957, qubes-updates-cache, qubes-updates-proxy
• design decision: Difficulty to upgrade Whonix Templates over clearnet considered a bug or feature?
• bug: Templates incorrectly think they're not connected to a Whonix gateway.

Troubleshooting

See Troubleshooting Qubes specific.

Connectivity Issues

See Troubleshooting Qubes specific.

bind-dirs flow chart

qubes-mount-dirs.service → /usr/lib/qubes/init/mount-dirs.sh → /usr/lib/qubes/bind-dirs.sh

qubes-whonix-postinit.service flow chart

qubes-whonix-postinit.service → /usr/lib/qubes-whonix/init/qubes-whonix-postinit →

• /usr/lib/qubes-whonix/bind-directories
• /usr/lib/qubes-whonix/replace-ips
• enable / disable Tor through qvm-service

lightdm autologin

sudo kate /etc/lightdm/lightdm.conf.d/user.conf

[SeatDefaults]
user-session=xfce
autologin-user=user

sudo systemctl enable lightdm

ssh into Qubes dom0

Moved to SSH into Qubes dom0.

releasever

Where/how does one set $relesever?

It is a yum/dnf magic variable - version of package providing system-release.

R3.1 template package in dom0 R3.2

In UpdateVM.

sudo rm -r /var/lib/qubes/dom0-updates/*

dom0.

sudo dnf remove qubes-template-whonix-ws

dom0.

sudo qubes-dom0-update --clean qubes-template-whonix-ws-3.0.6-201612190633

R3.2: *0628 R3.1: *0633

UEFI

• https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/uefi-troubleshooting/
• https://groups.google.com/g/qubes-users/c/Er10fhAR1Ro

Qubes VM debug mode

Quote Marek https://forums.whonix.org/t/whonix-live-mode/3894/36

Works only with HVM (on PVH or PV you don’t have emulated VGA). Also it enables more verbose logging - shouldn’t affect performance, but syslog in the VM may be hard to read in some cases. No other disadvantages.

See table at the bottom of https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/01/24/qsb-37-update/

VM type \ Qubes OS version         | 3.2 | 4.0-rc1-3 | 4.0-rc4 |
---------------------------------- | --- | --------- | ------- |
Default VMs without PCI devices    | PV  |    HVM    |   PVH   |

Conclusion: Qubes VM debug mode is not the way to go since in Qubes R4 the default for most VMs (that is VMs without PCI devices) (which includes Whonix) is PHV, since these don't have emulated VGA.

salt

Qubes salt management stack qubesctl

Qubes R4

This is what sudo qubesctl state.sls qvm.anon-whonix does in effect. It does not only do what qvm.anon-whonix does, since salt resolves dependencies. In other words, qvm.anon-whonix starts a chain reaction that includes all of the following.

• install packages from qubes-templates-community
  • install qubes-template-whonix-gateway-17
  • install qubes-template-whonix-workstation-17

• create VM called sys-whonix
  • with label: black
  • with 500 MB memory
  • with provides_network
  • enables autostart

• create a VM called anon-whonix
  • with label: red
  • with netvm: sys-whonix
  • default-dispvm: whonix-ws-dvm
  • add tag anon-vm

• create a VM called whonix-ws-dvm
  • as DispVM Template
  • with label: red
  • with netvm: sys-whonix
  • default-dispvm: whonix-ws-dvm
  • add tag anon-vm

• dom0 config changes
  • prepend /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.UpdatesProxy with the following text

$tag:whonix-updatevm $default allow,target=sys-whonix $tag:whonix-updatevm $anyvm deny

• • prepend /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.GetDate with

$tag:anon-vm $anyvm deny

Version Number

https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-mgmt-salt-dom0-virtual-machines/blob/main/qvm/whonix.jinja

sudo cat /srv/formulas/base/virtual-machines-formula/qvm/whonix.jinja

qvm-tags

Introduction

Qubes dom0 package qubes-core-admin-addon-whonix (__init__.py) (forum discussion) is responsible for:

• set NetVM to sys-whonix [...]
• set default DispVM set to whonix-ws-dvm [...]
• set tag anon-vm
• set tag anon-gateway

Qubes dom0 package qubes-mgmt-salt-dom0-virtual-machines will depend on qubes-core-admin-addon-whonix, therefore ensuring it will be installed. (T792) (#3881)

The template package qubes-whonix ships script /etc/qubes/post-install.d/30-whonix-ws.sh, which contains qvm-features-request whonix-ws=1, which is parsed by dom0 package qubes-core-agent-linux qubes RPC qubes.PostInstall.

As per Marek, qvm-features-request whonix-ws=1 should not be set by salt.

Missing Whonix tags anon-vm / anon-gateway will be added.

bug: qvm-tags not included in Qubes backups and not re-applied when restoring #4167

anon-vm tag

anon-vm gets prepended to /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.GetDate by salt template-whonix-ws.sls. Or maybe in future simpler by just adding it.

Tags are not reliably set yet. TODO: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4155 - That is something doable. But it's not a big deal for now since Qubes VMs have many ways to ask dom0 for the non-randomized time.

• make sure Qubes-Whonix has no access to clocksource=xen (unlikely to be fixed anytime soon without external help) (It matters in context of Clock Correlation Attack.
• set random clock offset for Qubes-Whonix VMs using mgmt to prevent clock correlation attacks
• prevent dom0 telling Qubes-Whonix VMs the time by using the mgmt stack for that / disable Qubes dom0 /etc/qubes-rpc/qubes.SetDateTime

Tags will be more important in future for sdwdate-gui-qubes but that is more usability, not security.

anon-gateway tag

anon-gateway tag will be used in future by sdwdate-gui-qubes.

whonix-updatevm tag

whonix-updatevm tag gets set by salt template-whonix-ws.sls as well as by qubes-core-admin-addon-whonix __init__.py.

By Qubes default, a VM with tag whonix-updatevm may only use target= sys-whonix as qubes.UpdatesProxy. Related user documentation: Multiple Qubes-Whonix Templates

TODO:

• old:
  • /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.UpdatesProxy
    • - $tag:whonix-updatevm $default allow,target=sys-whonix - $tag:whonix-updatevm $anyvm deny
• new:
  • /etc/qubes/policy.d/90-default.policy
  • /etc/qubes/policy.d/50-config-updates.policy
  • sudo grep -r -i --color updatesproxy /etc

view tags

To view tags.

qvm-tags whonix-gateway-17

qvm-tags whonix-workstation-17

qvm-tags anon-whonix list

qvm-tags sys-whonix list

See also:

• qvm-tags verification
• Qubes qvm-tags man page.

tags inheritance

Tags are not inherited. Generally settings are not inherited from Template by TemplateBasedVM. Where needed, core-admin-addon can be made to copy selected settings from Template to TemplateBasedVM.

qvm tags issues

Users are instructed to manually add qvm-tags in user documentation on these wiki page:

• Multiple_Whonix-Gateway
• Multiple Whonix-Workstation

This is because in corner cases qvm-tags are missing and resulting in sdwdate-gui issues. This is non-ideal usability wise.

Sparing users from needing to change this setting requires upstream Qubes feature request way to find out the name of gateway from inside the VM - qubesdb-read /qubes-gateway-name or qrexec feature request: send this over qrexec to the net qube I am connected to / sys-whonix hardcoded / sys-whonix unexpected autostart to get implemented.

Technical improvement proposals:

• https://phabricator.whonix.org/T930

https://forums.whonix.org/t/sys-whonix-starting-spontaneously-after-update/8123

qvm-features

To view VM features.

qvm-features vm-name

Check whonix-gateway-17 important qvm-features..

qvm-features whonix-gateway-17 | grep whonix-gw

Should should:

whonix-gw 1

Check whonix-workstation-17 important qvm-features.

qvm-features whonix-workstation-17 | grep whonix-ws

Should should:

whonix-ws 1

Testing Automated

• https://github.com/marmarek/openqa-tests-qubesos/blob/master/tests/whonix_firstrun.pm
• https://github.com/marmarek/openqa-tests-qubesos/blob/master/tests/whonixcheck.pm

Major Version Bump

Port Whonix 14 to Whonix 15

• https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builder/pull/81
• https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builder/pull/82
• https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-template-configs/pull/6

DD Backup Mount

sudo apt install thin-provisioning-tools

sudo cryptsetup luksOpen /dev/xvdi2 disk

sudo vgchange -aay

Find out /dev/dm-*

sudo lvscan

sudo mkdir /mnt/disk2

sudo mount /dev/dm-153 /mnt/disk2

all data can be found here:

ls -la /mnt/disk2/home/user/

Qubes VM Kernel

Required.

sudo mkdir -p /boot/grub

Required.

sudo apt install --no-install-recommends linux-image-amd64 linux-headers-amd64 grub2-common qubes-kernel-vm-support initramfs-tools busybox

Required.

sudo update-grub

Debian Minimal Template

sudo apt install qubes-core-agent-networking

Debug initramfs

Quote Marek:

Adding `debug=vc` to the kernel command line should make initramfs produce debug messages. Apparently it is also necessary to remove `console=tty0`, or at least make `console=hvc0` the last one. Otherwise the messages will end up on VGA, which isn't really present in PVH VM.

Mount Qubes Disk from Debian

This supposed that you either:

• made a backup of a drive that contains Qubes, OR
• that you unplugged a Qubes disk and attached it to another machine using Debian, OR
• that you booted from Debian using an external disk

Since Qubes uses LVM the process is a bit cumbersome.

Install dependencies.

sudo apt --yes install thin-provisioning-tools

Install a diff viewer of your choice such as meld.

sudo apt --yes install meld

Detach any disk containing Qubes.

Note what fdisk knows to file before.

sudo fdisk -l > before

Attach the disk containing Qubes.

Note what fdisk knows to file after.

sudo fdisk -l > after

Compare the two files with your favorite diff viewer. Example using meld:

meld before after

cryptsetup mount the disk. Example using /dev/sbc2.

sudo cryptsetup luksOpen /dev/sdc2 disk

cryptsetup mount the disk. Example using /dev/sdc2.

sudo cryptsetup luksOpen /dev/sdc2 disk

Run.

sudo vgchange -aay

Run.

sudo lvscan

Run.

sudo mkdir /mnt/disk

Mount LVM. Syntax: (replace vm-name with the actual name of the VM.

sudo mount /dev/qubes_dom0/vm-name-vm /mnt/disk

For example:

sudo mount /dev/qubes_dom0/vm-work /mnt/disk

All data can be found here:

ls -la /mnt/disk2/home/user/

Revert Qubes Template

An ultra fast way to revert Qubes Template to previous revision.

based on https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/volume-backup-revert/

In dom0.

Note: replace vmname with the actual name of the Template.

qvm-volume set vmname:root revisions_to_keep 2

qvm-volume revert vmname:root $(qvm-volume infovmname:root | tail -1)

Bash history and home folder in the template will remain. Perhaps confusing but can be an advantage.

Just template root being reverted. Private image not reverted. But could be done with qvm-volume revert too. Refer to upstream documentation.

See also:

qvm-volume info vmname:root

qvm-volume info vmname:root | tail -1

Qubes EFI Fallback Bootloader

• https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/8363
• https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/grubx64-efi-does-not-exist/18144/4

Copy files from /boot/efi/EFI/qubes/ to /boot/efi/EFI/BOOT/

sudo cp -r /boot/efi/EFI/qubes/* /boot/efi/EFI/BOOT/

Change filename grubx64.efi → BOOTX64.efi

sudo mv /boot/efi/EFI/BOOT/grubx64.efi /boot/efi/EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.efi

Change filename grub.cfg → BOOTX64.cfg

sudo mv /boot/efi/EFI/BOOT/grub.cfg /boot/efi/EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.cfg

See Also

• Dev/Test - How to "UnWhonix" - Instructions on how to remove Whonix Tor default networking for Whonix-Gateway. After applying these instructions, Whonix-Gateway will connect to clearnet.
• How to add a ProxyVM between anon-whonix and sys-whonix? (whonix-ws-email → sys-fw-whonix → whonix-gateway-17 → sys-firewall → sys-net)
• Dev/Qubes Remote Support

Footnotes

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