- 1 Voice over IP
- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 VoIP Servers and Privacy
- 1.3 VoIP Solutions
- 1.3.1 Tox
- 1.3.2 Mumble
- 1.3.3 Warnings
- 1.3.4 List
- 1.4 Sources
- 1.5 External Resources
- 1.6 Footnotes
Voice over IP
Anonymizing Voice over IP is somewhat difficult, but possible. It is not so much about hiding the IP, which is easy with Whonix, it is about voice recognition and slow Tor network speed (latency). Pseudonymous use or hidden voice communication with known contacts depends on your threat model.
For people behind Tor, who know each other, talking to each other, it is possible to hide the fact that they are talking with each other, from their ISP, government, exit relays, man-in-the-middle, etc. That wouldn't be anonymous, because they know each other.
You can't anonymously use your own voice and whistle-blow over VoIP. Voice gets recorded and voice recognition works well. When you are having a phone call later over a non anonymous connection (which almost everyone had at least once in its life, so everyone supplied a sample of their voice and name), they can correlate the two identities. You would have to use a voice scrambler and how good that works is a whole new field for research, which is outside the scope of Whonix.
You could type and let a artificial voice speak (like in anonymous videos), that could work. But is that the point? You better write a mail then.
It is also recommended against voice chatting with other anonymous people. (Like you can talk in a forum.) You don't know who you are talking to. That voice also could be correlated later, putting aside voice scrambler, or artificial voice, which wouldn't make sense.
If you are not calling from .onion to .onion (which delegates encryption to Tor), you should use a VoIP client supporting an end-to-end encryption protocol, such as ZRTP. ZRTP End-to-End Encryption cannot Protect VBR Streams. When using ZRTP + SRTP for encryption in any stretch that goes on the clearnet, be sure to never select a VBR (variable bitrate) codec as the pauses in a conversations produce fingerprints in the encrypted stream that allow the adversary to infer what words are being said. 
With ZRTP encryption make sure you compare authentication strings with the other party during the initial call. If they don't match then do not continue the call as it indicates an active MITM attack.
Some good libre software soft-phone programs are Linphone and Jitsi. However communicating directly over Tor with a VoIP server is not possible at the moment as SIP based clients all use UDP. You can still use a workaround but there are limitations. Please don't expect phone calls over Tor can't to be as convenient as over ordinary networks. This is because even when UDP packets are tunneled the restrictions of the underlying TCP protocol still apply. Push to talk will always work however, which is more like using walkie-talkie, push-to-talk. Useful advice has been given by the Guardian Project. They recommend to use prowords. Acknowledge the end of transmission (your speech, your sentence, what you just said) with the word "Roger". Once your calling partner hears "Roger", it knows, it is safe to answer and also terminate the answer with "Roger" or "Out" when leaving the conversation.
Other than the things said above, no additional anonymity/security problems are expected. It is less tested, so as for performance and voice quality, just try it and see yourself and please leave feedback.
VoIP Servers and Privacy
VoIP servers servers can still see call signalling metadata with end-to-end encryption. However if the VoIP IDs are anonymously registered, i.e. if no personal data is required for signing up, everyone only and always connects over Tor, never connected or will ever connect without Tor, and all calls are encrypted and you won't talk to strangers, there is probably very little a malicious server could log or do. 
Tox   looks like a promising solution for secure, encrypted communications. The official client implementation is based on the Toxcore protocol library, which is very feature-rich and has a variety of functions besides VOIP. By default, Tox does not attempt to cloak your IP address from authorized contacts. However, Tox connections can be tunneled through Tor, allowing communication with others even if they are not anonymous.  Desktop and mobile client versions have been developed for every major OS platform. 
In the Tox design, users are assigned a public and private key, with direct connections being established in a peer-to-peer network. Users can message friends, join chat rooms with friends or strangers, and send each other files. Everything is encrypted using the NaCl crypto library, via libsodium.  . Tox helps to protect your privacy by: 
- Removing the need to rely on central authorities to provide messenger services
- Concealing your identity (in the form of meta-data, e.g. your IP address) from people who are not your authorized friends
- Enforcing end-to-end encryption with perfect forward secrecy as the default and only mode of operation for all messages
- Making your identity impossible to forge without the possession of your personal private key, which never leaves your computer
- Voice and video calls.
- Instant messaging.
- Desktop screen sharing / streaming.
- File sharing.
- Typing indicators.
- Message read-receipts.
- Profile encryption.
- Group messaging, voice and video conferencing.
Additional features can be implemented by any client, so long as they are supported by the core protocol. Features that are not related to the core networking system are left up to the client. 
|Security warning: Adding a third party repository allows the vendor to replace any package on your system. Proceed at your own risk! See Foreign Sources for further information. For greater safety, users adding third party repositories should always use Multiple Whonix-Workstations to compartmentalize VMs with additional software.|
Note: The following instructions will install the "qTox" graphical user client to your system.  To install the lightweight version with minimal dependencies ("uTox") or another Linux client like Ricin, Toxic or Toxygen, see here and here.
In the Whonix-Workstation (Qubes-Whonix: whonix-ws TemplateVM), open a terminal (Konsole).
Download the Tox repository release key. 
wget -nv http://download.opensuse.org/repositories/home:antonbatenev:tox/Debian_8.0/Release.key -O Release.key
Debian stretch, see footnote: 
Check the fingerprint before importing anything.
gpg --keyid-format long --with-fingerprint Release.key
Always check the fingerprint for yourself. 
At time of writing, the fingerprint was.
pub rsa2048/F2AA0B1E5EF8303B 2014-09-04 [SC] [expires: 2019-01-21] Key fingerprint = 3EB5 027B 3CD8 D7CA AC30 EB6B F2AA 0B1E 5EF8 303B uid home:antonbatenev OBS Project <home:firstname.lastname@example.org>
Convert the Tox signing key to a keyring that can be used by apt-get.
gpg --no-default-keyring --keyring ./tox-pubkey.gpg --import Release.key
Add the Tox signing key.
sudo cp tox-pubkey.gpg /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/tox-pubkey.gpg
Add the Tox apt repository. 
sudo sh -c 'echo deb http://download.opensuse.org/repositories/home:/antonbatenev:/tox/Debian_8.0/ / > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/qtox.list'
Update the package lists.
sudo apt-get install qtox
The Tox repository and qTox have now been installed.
TODO: Add instructions on how to use Tox with Stream Isolation without Tor over Tor.
- Looks a bit like Team Speak without its disadvantages.
- It is Open Source.
- And supports client to server encryption.
- Supports push to talk.
- You can (and must) force TCP mode, because the Tor network does not support UDP yet.
- One has to act as server.
- Everyone else can act as client.
- If the server admin runs the server on its local machine and also wants to connect to the server, the admin should connect locally to the server, i.e. to 127.0.0.1 and not the onion service domain to have faster connection.
- For group chats you have to consider, that there is no end-to-end encryption and once the server has been compromised, conversions are no longer private. However, if two people use mumble just to talk to each other this doesn't matter and you could safely do that with mumble.
- When one of the two communication partners hosts a mumble server as Tor onion service and the other one connects over Tor, encryption is already provided by Tor. There are different ways to achieve security. In this case, setting a server password (explained below), should be sufficient. Mumble's own encryption is not required. Alternatively, feel free to learn about mumble certificates for defense in depth, channel passwords instead of server password and so on.
Mumble Server Instructions
If you want to read and introduction about onion services and to learn about about onion service security, see Onion Services.
If you also want to run a hidden web server on the same .onion domain (nice for testing and learning Onion Services basics), see Onion Services.
|For Whonix 14 and later releases, all unique Tor configurations should be stored in /usr/local/etc/torrc.d/50_user.conf. Users should not edit /etc/tor/torrc directly.|
HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/mumble_service/ HiddenServicePort 64738 10.152.152.11:64738
To get your Tor onion service url.
sudo cat /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/hostname
Reminder: Always backup the onion service key. This is necessary in order to restore it on another machine, on a newer Whonix-Gateway, after HDD/SSD failure, etc. Follow the instructions below to find its location; root permission is required to access it.
Update package lists.
Install the mumble-server package.
sudo apt-get install mumble-server
Configure the server.
sudo dpkg-reconfigure mumble-server
The following questions...
- Autostart, better yes. Otherwise you would have to "sudo service mumble-server start", which didn't work for me.
- Higher priority? Yes.
- Password: choose a secure password.
There is also an upstream Murmur, i.e. mumble server guide. The upstream guide does not consider onion services, that's the part already described here. For any other questions regarding the server setup, you can also refer to the upstream documentation.
Set a server password. Open /etc/mumble-server.ini.
Open /etc/mumble-server.ini in an editor with root rights.
Search for "serverpassword=" and file in.
sudo service mumble-server restart
Update package lists.
sudo apt-get install mumble
Start menu -> Applications -> Internet -> Voice Chat
Configure mumble to your liking.
Enable Force TCP mode.
Go to Configure -> Check "Advanced" -> Network -> Check "Force TCP mode" -> Ok
Add a new server:
Server -> Connect -> Add new -> Label : anything, can be same as .onion domain name Address : your .onion domain name or, if the mumble server is running in your own Whonix-Workstation choose 127.0.0.1 Port : 64738 Username: anything
You can now connect to the server.
 Implementing privacy critical software in a browser is seen as a bad and dangerous idea by security conscious Free Software developers. Browser security holes and lack of adequate process isolation, could lead to theft of private encryption keys by a malicious code running in the browser.
USB Webcam Passthrough
The firmware of USB devices could be flashed by malware and cross infect the host.
The developer of TOR Fone (a fork of SpeakFreely) recommends against using TOR Fone. Quote: "I did not think this project as a finished product for practical use." The project got overall a pretty bad review in the mailing list thread.
Does this mean that, for example, is my IP and location safe when using Skype?
Yes, IP and location is safe. Skype has been tested in Whonix, it "works" quite well (does it? it seems to have stopped working in 2013 - see ), still recommended against. Some further comments you should be aware of:
Those are not Whonix or Tor issues, those are Skype issues. Consider Skype usage pseudonymous rather than anonymous. Skype is closed source and given Skype's history (reading BIOS etc. just research) it is very much likely that they link all your account names inside Whonix-Workstation to the same pseudonym.
Also obviously, if you log into an account, which you have ever used without Tor, consider the account non-anonymous. You really should assume, that they have logs and link your Tor and non-Tor use together.
Security doesn't depend on your local security and key management, but on a third party, the Skype authority. Consider the Skype encryption broken by the Skype authority.
Another obvious thing, if you chat with people, who have not created their account over Tor and who have not always connected over Tor, it is also not so hard to guess who you are. Remember, you are not in control of Skype's encryption keys and Skype is not Open Source, thus do not rely on Skype's encryption.
Voice recognition software also got very sophisticated. Since you should be unsure if the Skype encryption is broken or not, voice recognition software could be used to find out who you are.
Also read Do not mix Modes of Anonymity!
In conclusion Skype usage does not leak IP/location, but is discouraged anyway, unless you want to use it for circumvention only, without wanting to be anonymous or pseudonymous.
What's the point in using Skype if you and all your chat partners are also willing to create and use their accounts only over Tor? You are advised to use Skype alternatives.
If you are wondering, why Skype works at all in Whonix over Tor, since Tor only supports TCP, see technical details: 
There is a Comparison of VoIP software in wikipedia. The client should be Open Source and if you are not calling from .onion to .onion (and let Tor handle encryption) it should also support voice encryption such as ZRTP.
- Not Whonix specific, still interesting: Location-Anonymous Voice Communication, A Step-by-Step Guide
- Apart from trying to exploit random Tor users.
- Depending on the mobile / desktop client in use.
- This repository is directly referenced on the Tox Download webpage, see: https://software.opensuse.org/download.html?project=home%3Aantonbatenev%3Atox&package=qtox Anton Batenev is a Tox developer.
- For later Whonix releases based on Debian Stretch, replace "Debian_8.0" with "Debian_Stretch".
wget -O - http://download.opensuse.org/repositories/home:antonbatenev:tox/Debian_Stretch/Release.key
- The list of GPG fingerprints currently in use by qTox developers can be referenced at https://github.com/qTox/qTox
- For later Whonix releases based on Debian Stretch, replace "Debian_8.0" with "Debian_Stretch".
- Mumble (and mumble-server)'s connections go through Tor's TransPort. This shouldn't matter, because (connections to and ) onion services (itself) are stream isolated so or so, see Stream Isolation for more information on TransPort, SocksPort, Stream Isolation and so on.
Skype can’t work without a TCP connection
But Skype can work without UDP
Blocking UDP is not sufficient
https | (forcing) onion
This is a wiki. Want to improve this page? Help is welcome and volunteer contributions are happily considered! See Conditions for Contributions to Whonix, then Edit! IP addresses are scrubbed, but editing over Tor is recommended. Edits are held for moderation.