Install Additional Software Safely

Easy

Introduction

Qubes-Whonix ™ users need to install and update persistant software ^[archive] in the Whonix-Workstation ™ Template(s) (whonix-ws-16).

---

Using apt-get in the (anon-whonix) App Qube will only install software for the current session, with changes being lost when the VM is shut down; see Install Software in an App Qube.

A primary Whonix ™ goal is to greatly reduce the risk posed by (additional) software installations that are not exclusively designed to work with Tor.

Users can install any software inside Whonix-Workstation ™ using apt-get, since it is based on Debian. However, this is not a recommendation for installing additional software. Also, Whonix ™ is currently the most secure platform for running Tor-unsafe applications like the former Adobe Flash plugin (now deprecated); see the operating system comparison.

The Whonix ™ software page lists:

• pre-installed Whonix ™ applications which are available for different tasks
• recommended software for different user activities
• safety advice
• installation instructions

Install from Debian stable

To install a package from Debian stable, follow the steps below. Replace package-name with the name of the software to be installed.

Install package-name.

1. Update the package lists.

sudo apt-get update

sudo apt-get update

2. Upgrade the system.

sudo apt-get dist-upgrade

sudo apt-get dist-upgrade

3. Install the package-name package.

Using apt-get command line parameter --no-install-recommends is in most cases optional.

sudo apt-get install --no-install-recommends package-name

sudo apt-get install --no-install-recommends package-name

The procedure of installing package-name is complete.

There are numerous examples of this procedure in the Software chapter and throughout the wiki.

Best Practices

Table: Best Software Installation Practices

Domain	Advice
Always Verify Signatures	For greater system security, it is strongly recommended to avoid installing unsigned software. Always make sure that signing keys and signatures are correct and/or use mechanisms that heavily simplify and automate this process, like apt-get upgrades. Note: digital signatures are not a magic bullet. While they increase the certainty that no backdoor was introduced by a third party during transit, this does not mean the software is absolutely "backdoor-free". Learn more about this process and what digital signatures prove.
Avoid Manual Software Installation	Generally avoid the manual installation of packages, even trusted ones. In practice that means software should only be installed with apt-get, unless special circumstances exist. Other risks: foreign packages are often unsigned, and users may forget to regularly update the software.
Avoid Third Party Package Managers	There are many third party package managers besides APT, however many lack the security safeguards that are standard in Debian. Popular examples are pip and node.js. The security concern with third party options is they do not verify the code comes from the author. When used, these package managers run processes that pull untrusted code from the Internet and perform operations with root level permissions. If a trusted Workstation VM is required for sensitive use cases such as a Bitcoin wallet, then completely avoid this option.
Prefer APT	The safest option is to stick with Debian's official package manager APT. This is referenced throughout the wiki whenever the user runs apt-get. APT is a secure package manager which passes the TUF threat model, since it features metadata verification and expiration detection.
Prefer Packages from Debian Stable Repository	Considering the risks, it is safest to install new software from Debian's stable repository, rather than the testing / unstable or third party repositories -- the Debian FAQ [archive] provides a strong rationale for using the stable repository; see footnote. Only advanced users should attempt to mix packages from Debian testing or Debian unstable. The reason is it can lead to a dependency hell, making it very difficult to resolve the breakage of APT package management. To use newer package versions, see chapter Install Newer Software Versions.

--no-install-recommends

Debian's installation default is --install-recommends. Debian packages have various metadata fields such as:

• Depends: dependencies or dependency packages
• Recommends: "recommended" packages
• Suggests: "suggested" packages

When installing a package using apt-get, dependencies (Depends:) are always installed. The Debian default is for recommended packages (Recommends:) to also be installed alongside the primary package (unless installed previously). To avoid that outcome, it is possible to use the apt-get command line parameter --no-install-recommends; this is in most cases optional.

Debian's default for suggested packages (Suggests:) is --no-install-suggests i.e. not to install suggested packages. Users can optionally use --install-suggests, but there are no known cases where this would be useful at the time of writing. A host of other command line options ^[archive] are also available.

If a package is installed using apt-get --no-install-recommends install package-name, then re-running apt-get without any parameters or even with --install-recommends will not result in installation of the recommended packages. To accomplish a "late" installation of recommended packages, the simplest method is first uninstalling the package. Alternatively, the list of Recommends: can be viewed using apt-cache package-name or by checking the package on https://packages.debian.org ^[archive].

A brief Q&A regarding the potential impacts of the "recommended" field is outlined below.

Table: --no-install-recommends Impacts

Question	Answer
Can using --no-install-recommends lead to security issues?	No.
Can using --no-install-recommends lead to missing or broken functionalities?	Yes. For example, mmdebstrap [archive] uses Recommends: and Suggests: for various optional dependencies providing various functionality [archive].
Can omitting --no-install-recommends lead to security issues?	In corner cases, yes. For example consider a host operating system without a Host Firewall. By omitting --no-install-recommends -- which defaults in using Debian's default --install-recommends -- packages might be installed that open ports, which can significantly increase attack surface.
Should --no-install-recommends be used?	The answer depends on the specific package. Advanced users who know exactly which packages are needed can use --no-install-recommends and afterwards manually add any wanted/additional packages to the apt-get installation command. Otherwise, there might be corner cases of missing optional dependencies or limited functionality.
Should Whonix ™ set the default to --no-install-recommends?	This is a good question. It is a big change and could lead to a lot of broken functionality for user-installed packages. At the moment, Whonix ™ user support is manageable because redirection to the Free Support Principle is possible. If --no-install-recommends was the Whonix ™ default, then a lot of functionality might work out of the box in Debian but not in Whonix ™, therefore invalidating the Free Support Principle. For these reasons, such suggestions should first be raised at Debian's issue tracker after first searching for existing discussions on Debian mailing lists. Search Debian APT issue tracker [archive] for recommend first to avoid duplicate issues. For this change to be implemented, it would probably require a lot of research, good examples and a very well written feature request.

Whonix ™ documentation uses --no-install-recommends whenever appropriate. In general, whether users should use --no-install-recommends for package installation is unspecific to Whonix ™ and should be resolved as per Free Support Principle.

More Security

General Advice

Whonix ™ users are free to install their favorite software packages, but should be aware that additional software increases the attack surface ^[archive] of the platform. Almost any application can be installed, with a few exceptions for programs that are impossible to torify ^[archive]. In addition, Whonix ™ provides:

• protection from IP and DNS leaks (see above for details)
• partial protection against protocol leaks and fingerprinting, but this is far from perfect

Users are responsible for trying to prevent any other protocol leaks ^[archive] using the "Torify: How-to" guide ^[archive], but most of those are mitigated by Whonix ™.

apt-get Meta-data

When updating with apt-get, information will leak about which software packages and versions have been installed, unless Tor onion repositories have been configured. This meta-data cannot be directly linked to any other activity like web browsing, because the Whonix ™ apt-get uwt wrapper forces it to pass through its own circuit. Despite this isolation, it is still possible for updates to be correlated with the same pseudonym.

Recommendations

For greater security when updating:

• Follow the guidelines below.
• Be especially careful when adding custom repositories, particularly Personal Package Archives (PPAs). Compared to main distribution repositories, solo developers are more susceptible to influence and theoretically might have malicious intent.
• Read the protocol leak and fingerprinting protection entry first. It highlights useful information, like the fact that DNS and IP-related leaks do not apply to Whonix ™.
• Refer to the Tor Project's Torify: How-to ^[archive] which discusses various protocol leaks ^[archive] and how to mitigate them.
• Review the Tor Project's Transparent Proxy Leaks ^[archive] documentation, which is particularly relevant for Microsoft Windows.

How-to: Install or Update with Utmost Caution

1. Stop all activities and shutdown any open applications like Tor Browser.
2. Change the Tor circuit -- this step may not apply if the user is running an onion service.
3. Update using apt-get after a random delay. By default, a new Tor circuit is generated after 10 seconds.
4. Change the Tor circuit again.
5. Continue user activities after another random period has elapsed.

Whonix-Workstation ™ is Firewalled

Note: This section is relevant to server software or other advanced / uncommon applications.

The Whonix-Gateway ™ firewall has several effects upon Whonix-Workstation ™.

Table: Whonix-Gateway ™ Firewall Effects

Category	Notes
Additional Firewall Restrictions	The firewall on Whonix-Gateway ™ is very restrictive. It can be made even more restrictive by activating options within the firewall script. It is possible to limit which outgoing ports are redirected to Tor's TransPort. Depending on user intentions, it could also be useful to remove all SocksPorts.
DNS Requests	Standard DNS requests on UDP port 53 are redirected to Tor's DnsPort.
Incoming Connections	Incoming connections are not supported. If programs make outgoing connections, then incoming connections are accepted for web browsing, IRC, or other relevant applications. Server ports ("open ports") are blocked. Unless explicitly configured, the Ident Protocol / web server listening port is not reachable.
IPv6	Tor only partially supports IPv6 [archive], although full implementation is likely in the near term. This is not a Whonix ™-specific issue.
Server Services	Onion Services and/or Location Hidden Services can be hosted.
Tor Routing	All traffic originating from Whonix-Workstation ™ and Whonix-Gateway ™ is routed over Tor. Refer to the footnotes for further information.
UDP	Tor does not support UDP. This is not a Whonix ™-specific issue.

Related topics:

• Whonix-Gateway ™ Firewall
• Whonix-Workstation ™ Firewall
• Ports

Advanced

Install Newer Software Versions

Prerequisite knowledge: refer to the Frozen Packages entry in the Operating System Software and Updates chapter.

It is sometimes possible to install newer versions of software applications, either via available backports or by manual installation. When intending to use newer versions of certain applications like Electrum or Monero it is best to approach the process as an application installation, rather than an application update.

In oversimplified terms, a Debian package is just a vehicle to place files into a location. For example, the binaries-freedom Debian package ^[archive] in Whonix ™ ships Electrum. It comes with the appimage file (/usr/share/binaries-freedom/electrum-appimage/electrum-4.0.7-x86_64.AppImage) and a start menu entry (/usr/share/applications/electrum-appimage.desktop). The presence of these files does not impose limitations; it is still possible to customize the system and install newer software versions.

These files can also be ignored; for example it is not necessary to use the electrum-appimage start menu entry. The binaries-freedom package is intended to improve usability and it was never designed to limit customization, nor does it have that side effect. As per Whonix ™ policy there are No Intentional User Freedom Restrictions.

As an illustration, a newer version of Electrum would require:

1. uninstalling binaries-freedom (electrum appimage)
2. installing Electrum appimage

To install other custom software, it is suggested to follow recommendations throughout this chapter for better security. Specific instructions for custom software installations will vary for each application. This process is mostly unspecific to Whonix ™ and therefore the Free Support Principle applies to installation steps. The same is true for Qubes-Whonix ™ users -- first consider how this process would be achieved in a Debian-based Qubes template.

Backports

Debian Backports ^[archive]:

Backports are packages taken from the next Debian release (called "testing"), adjusted and recompiled for usage on Debian stable.

This is a far safer alternative than the Debian testing or unstable repositories. However, Debian backports should be used conservatively.

Backports cannot be tested as extensively as Debian stable, and backports are provided on an as-is basis, with risk of incompatibilities with other components in Debian stable. Use with care!

Replace package-name below with the package you actually want to install.

package-name can be installed from Debian backports. This is non-ideal, see footnote.

1. Boot Whonix-Workstation ™ (whonix-ws-16) Template.

2. Add the current Debian stable backports codename bullseye-backports to Debian apt sources.

Note: Already default in Whonix ™ version 16 and above.

Note: This applies to Whonix ™ 16. Later Whonix ™ versions may use a codename different to bullseye.

In Whonix-Workstation ™ (whonix-ws-16) Template, run.

sudo su -c "echo -e 'deb tor+https://deb.debian.org/debian bullseye-backports main contrib non-free' > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/backports.list"

sudo su -c "echo -e 'deb tor+https://deb.debian.org/debian bullseye-backports main contrib non-free' > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/backports.list"

Alternatively, users who like Onionizing Repositories can set the .onion mirror.

sudo su -c "echo -e 'deb tor+http://2s4yqjx5ul6okpp3f2gaunr2syex5jgbfpfvhxxbbjwnrsvbk5v3qbid.onion/debian bullseye-backports main contrib non-free' > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/backports.list"

sudo su -c "echo -e 'deb tor+http://2s4yqjx5ul6okpp3f2gaunr2syex5jgbfpfvhxxbbjwnrsvbk5v3qbid.onion/debian bullseye-backports main contrib non-free' > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/backports.list"

3. Update the package lists.

sudo apt-get update

sudo apt-get update

4. Install the select software.

sudo apt-get -t bullseye-backports install package-name

sudo apt-get -t bullseye-backports install package-name

The procedure is now complete.

5. Undo.

On occasion it is necessary to undo this configuration, for example when upgrading from Debian bullseye to bookworm. To proceed, run.

sudo rm /etc/apt/sources.list.d/backports.list

sudo rm /etc/apt/sources.list.d/backports.list

Fasttrack

Debian Fasttrack ^[archive]:

Debian Fast Track is a repository that allows making “backports” of packages available to users of the stable distribution, if those packages cannot be maintained in testing and backported in the usual way.

This is a far safer alternative than the Debian testing or unstable repositories. However, Debian fasttrack should be used conservatively similarly to Backports.

Backports cannot be tested as extensively as Debian stable, and backports are provided on an as-is basis, with risk of incompatibilities with other components in Debian stable. Use with care!

Replace package-name below with the package you actually want to install.

package-name can be installed from Debian fasttrack. This is non-ideal.

1. Boot Whonix-Workstation ™ (whonix-ws-16) Template.

2. Package fasttrack-archive-keyring must be installed from Debian backports.

Note: Already default in Whonix ™ version 16 and above.

3. Add the current Debian stable fasttrack codename bullseye-fasttrack to Debian apt sources.

Note: Already default in Whonix ™ version 16 and above.

Note: This applies to Whonix ™ 16. Later Whonix ™ versions may use a codename different to bullseye.

In Whonix-Workstation ™ (whonix-ws-16) Template, run.

sudo su -c "echo -e 'deb tor+https://fasttrack.debian.net/debian/ bullseye-fasttrack main contrib non-free' > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/fasttrack.list"

sudo su -c "echo -e 'deb tor+https://fasttrack.debian.net/debian/ bullseye-fasttrack main contrib non-free' > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/fasttrack.list"

It is not yet possible to set an .onion mirror for fastrack; see footnote.

4. Update the package lists.

sudo apt-get update

sudo apt-get update

5. Install the select software.

sudo apt-get -t bullseye-fasttrack install package-name

sudo apt-get -t bullseye-fasttrack install package-name

The procedure is now complete.

6. Undo.

On occasion it is necessary to undo this configuration, for example when upgrading from Debian bullseye to bookworm. To proceed, run.

sudo rm /etc/apt/sources.list.d/fasttrack.list

sudo rm /etc/apt/sources.list.d/fasttrack.list

Install from Debian Testing

Warnings

Mixing packages from Debian stable with those from a later release like testing can destabilize the system due to associated software dependencies required for full functionality.

Before completing steps in this section, first read Prefer Packages from Debian Stable Repository. Carefully check how packages will change before proceeding -- a host of upgrades is usually safe, but no Whonix ™ packages should be removed as part of the process; see Whonix Debian Packages. Be aware that problems are still possible; see here ^[archive] for an example.

It is recommended to complete this process in a separate Whonix-Workstation ™ (whonix-ws-16-debian-testing-mix) due to the risks. Ask for advice in the forums on a case-by-case basis.

Procedure

1. Boot the Whonix-Workstation ™ (whonix-ws-16-debian-testing-mix) Template.

2. Add the current Debian testing codename bookworm to sources.list

Note: this applies to Whonix ™ 16. Later Whonix ™ versions may use a codename different to bookworm.

In the Whonix-Workstation ™ (whonix-ws-16-debian-testing-mix) Template, run.

sudo su -c "echo -e 'deb http://http.debian.net/debian bookworm main' > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/testing.list"

sudo su -c "echo -e 'deb http://http.debian.net/debian bookworm main' > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/testing.list"

Or alternatively use the .onion mirror.

sudo su -c "echo -e 'deb tor+http://2s4yqjx5ul6okpp3f2gaunr2syex5jgbfpfvhxxbbjwnrsvbk5v3qbid.onion/debian bookworm main' > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/testing.list"

sudo su -c "echo -e 'deb tor+http://2s4yqjx5ul6okpp3f2gaunr2syex5jgbfpfvhxxbbjwnrsvbk5v3qbid.onion/debian bookworm main' > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/testing.list"

3. Update the package lists.

sudo apt-get update

sudo apt-get update

4. Install the select software.

sudo apt-get -t bookworm install packagename

sudo apt-get -t bookworm install packagename

• Replace packagename with the package you actually want to install.

The procedure is now complete.

5. Undo.

On occasion it is necessary to undo this configuration, for example when upgrading from Debian bullseye to bookworm. To proceed, run.

sudo rm /etc/apt/sources.list.d/testing.list

sudo rm /etc/apt/sources.list.d/testing.list

Install from Debian Unstable

Warnings

Managing security updates for the "stable" distribution remains the highest priority for the Debian security team. This means security fixes for Debian "unstable" are managed by the contributors themselves and not by the Debian security team. Therefore, "unstable" does not receive security updates in a timely manner.

Before completing steps in this section, first read Prefer Packages from Debian Stable Repository.

Mixing packages from Debian stable with those from a later release like unstable can destabilize the system due to associated software dependencies required for full functionality. First carefully check how packages will change before proceeding.

A host of upgrades is usually safe, but no Whonix ™ packages should be removed as part of the process; see Whonix Debian Packages. It is recommended to complete this process in a separate Whonix-Workstation ™ (whonix-ws-16-debian-unstable-mix) due to the risk. Ask for advice in the forums on a case-by-case basis.

Procedure

Prior to installing package-name ^[archive] from Debian unstable read Install software from Debian unstable to understand the risks involved and circumvention options. Mixing packages from Debian stable with later release packages like Debian unstable can lead to instability.

1. Open a terminal.

If you are using Qubes-Whonix ™, complete the following steps.

Qubes App Launcher (blue/grey "Q") → Whonix-Workstation ™ App Qube (commonly named anon-whonix) → Xfce Terminal

If you are using a graphical Whonix ™ with XFCE, run.

Start Menu → Xfce Terminal

2. In Whonix-Workstation ™ (whonix-ws-16 Qubes-Whonix ™) konsole, add Debian stable codename bullseye to the apt-conf default-release.

sudo su -c "echo -e 'APT::Default-Release bullseye;' > /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/70defaultrelease"

sudo su -c "echo -e 'APT::Default-Release bullseye;' > /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/70defaultrelease"

3. Add the current Debian unstable codename sid to sources.list.d.

sudo su -c "echo -e 'deb http://http.debian.net/debian sid main' > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/unstable.list"

sudo su -c "echo -e 'deb http://http.debian.net/debian sid main' > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/unstable.list"

Or alternatively use the .onion mirror.

sudo su -c "echo -e 'deb tor+http://2s4yqjx5ul6okpp3f2gaunr2syex5jgbfpfvhxxbbjwnrsvbk5v3qbid.onion/debian sid main' > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/unstable.list"

sudo su -c "echo -e 'deb tor+http://2s4yqjx5ul6okpp3f2gaunr2syex5jgbfpfvhxxbbjwnrsvbk5v3qbid.onion/debian sid main' > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/unstable.list"

4. Update the package lists.

sudo apt-get update

sudo apt-get update

5. Install package-name from the current Debian unstable codename sid repository.

sudo apt-get install package-name/sid

sudo apt-get install package-name/sid

6. Undo.

On occasion it is necessary to undo this configuration, for example when upgrading from Debian bullseye to bookworm. To proceed, run.

Delete Debian testing repository list.

sudo rm /etc/apt/sources.list.d/unstable.list

sudo rm /etc/apt/sources.list.d/unstable.list

Delete apt Default-Release configuration.

sudo rm /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/70defaultrelease

sudo rm /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/70defaultrelease

Package Reinstallation

As per the free support principle, package reinstallation utilizes normal Debian processes.

The example below shows how the thunderbird package would be reinstalled. It is possible to substitute thunderbird with many other packages, so long as they do not have too many dependencies. These instructions are not suitable for any packages needed for connectivity such as tor, because the reinstallation would be very difficult and is currently unsupported.

Even in the thunderbird package example, dependency complications emerge. In the example below the qubes-whonix-workstation-packages-recommended package also depends on thunderbird. Further, the qubes-whonix-workstation package depends on qubes-whonix-workstation-packages-recommended.

1. Update the package lists and upgrade.

See Updates for instructions.

2. Purge the package you want to reinstall.

sudo apt-get purge thunderbird

sudo apt-get purge thunderbird

The output will show something like the following.

The following packages will be REMOVED:
  qubes-thunderbird* qubes-whonix-workstation*
  qubes-whonix-workstation-packages-recommended* thunderbird*
0 upgraded, 0 newly installed, 4 to remove and 0 not upgraded.
After this operation, 192 MB disk space will be freed.
Do you want to continue? [Y/n] 
(Reading database ... 64719 files and directories currently installed.)
Removing qubes-whonix-workstation (3:21.5-1) ...
Removing qubes-whonix-workstation-packages-recommended (1:16.5-1) ...
Removing qubes-thunderbird (2.0.6-1+deb10u1) ...
Removing thunderbird (1:78.14.0-1~deb10u1) ...
Processing triggers for mime-support (3.62) ...
Processing triggers for hicolor-icon-theme (0.17-2) ...
Processing triggers for man-db (2.8.5-2) ...
Processing triggers for qubes-core-agent (4.0.62-1+deb10u1) ...
Processing triggers for desktop-file-utils (0.23-4) ...
(Reading database ... 64597 files and directories currently installed.)
Purging configuration files for thunderbird (1:78.14.0-1~deb10u1) ...

The packages qubes-whonix-workstation-packages-recommended and qubes-whonix-workstation have been inadvertently uninstalled due to technical limitations. These packages are reinstalled at a later step.

3. Delete the user configuration folder if that is desired.

In this thunderbird example, the user configuration folder is specified below (it changes depending on the package).

rm -r ~/.thunderbird

rm -r ~/.thunderbird

4. Reinstall the thunderbird package and the additional packages that were purged.

The --no-install-recommends parameter below is optional.

sudo apt-get install --no-install-recommends thunderbird qubes-whonix-workstation-packages-recommended qubes-whonix-workstation

sudo apt-get install --no-install-recommends thunderbird qubes-whonix-workstation-packages-recommended qubes-whonix-workstation

Related to: Whonix Debian Packages.

Install Software in an App Qube

Qubes-Whonix ™ only! Custom scripting is recommended, which is beyond the scope of this entry. Use a search engine to locate free articles and instructions on this process.

There is no reason to avoid installing software in App Qubes ^[archive], although installed software will not persist across reboots. A custom script can be used to automate this process, which minimizes the time spent re-installing packages.

Advantages

This software installation method means a single VM ^[archive] assumes many of the positive characteristics found in both App Qubes and Standalones ^[archive].

• Centralized Updates: App Qubes ^[archive] are based on a Template ^[archive]. This means the App Qube's root filesystem is based on the corresponding template's root filesystem. Any updates to the Template will be reflected in the App Qube's root filesystem upon restart.
• Minimal Disk Usage: App Qubes require much less disk space than Standalones, since the App Qube's root filesystem is based on the corresponding template. The App Qube only needs enough disk space to hold user files in the /home directory.
• Semi-persistent Storage: User data stored in /home , /rw and /usr/local survives reboot. Many applications like Signal ^[archive] and Wire ^[archive] store user data in the /home folder. Since the custom script installs the software seamlessly with little or no user interaction, the App Qube has "quasi-full persistence", not unlike a Standalone's full persistence.

App Qube Preparation

1. Create an App Qube based on whonix-ws-16.

2. Pre-install any necessary dependencies.

Dependencies are available from packages.debian.org ^[archive] and can be pre-installed in the Template to speed up the repetitive software installation process. This means only packages or software missing from packages.debian.org ^[archive] will be repeatedly installed in the App Qube.

3. Create a custom script that runs at VM boot.

The purpose of this script is to automate software installation that would otherwise require manual user steps. Note that script functionality is variable, dependent on the software packages being installed and the experience of the user.

Scripting is useful for common tasks like:

• adding specific software repositories
• importing verified signing keys
• updating the package list with apt-get update, after the repository and signing key are imported
• finally running apt-get install to install the relevant software package(s)

App Qube Use

The App Qube's root filesystem does not provide a strong non-persistent security feature ^[archive]. The persistence of the /home, /rw, and /usr/local filesystem means malware can be specifically written to target Qubes-based App Qubes, inserting hooks inside these directory's files.

Once user preparation is complete and the App Qube has started, it will automatically start the script to begin installing software. When the process finishes, the App Qube can be used like any other. However when the App Qube is shutdown, all data outside of the persistent /home folder will be lost, including the newly installed software packages. Following reboot, the VM will again install the software packages automatically.

Using bind-dirs Selective Persistence

Using selective bind-dirs ^[archive] persistence is currently a difficult problem and undocumented. Further research is required to ascertain which files require persistence across VM reboots.

Add Application Launcher to Start Menu

1. Create folder ~/.local/share/applications.

mkdir -p ~/.local/share/applications

mkdir -p ~/.local/share/applications

2. Create a new file ~/.local/share/applications/program-name.desktop using an editor.

mousepad ~/.local/share/applications/program-name.desktop

mousepad ~/.local/share/applications/program-name.desktop

3. Paste the following contents.

[Desktop Entry]
Type=Application
Exec=/path/to/program
Name=program-name
Categories=Other

[Desktop Entry] Type=Application Exec=/path/to/program Name=program-name Categories=Other

4. Save the file.

The procedure is now complete.

The launcher can be found here:

Start Menu → Other → program-name

snap

General forum discussion about snap: Snap Store / snaps / snapd / snapcraft.io - a new software source? ^[archive]

Qubes-Whonix ™ issues:

• Efforts to persistently install snap apps in Qubes-Whonix ™ via bind-dirs ^[archive] or with snap proxy settings have been unsuccessful. This means it must be installed in an App Qube on every occasion it is required. Efforts to improve this situation are most welcome, see: Wickr Me vs Qubes-Whonix Persistence ^[archive] and snap totally unusable on Qubes whonix-ws ^[archive].
• Qubes Templates are non-networked by default, which means snap does not run inside whonix-ws-16 Template. It is likely snap is similarly affected in other Qubes' Templates like the Debian Template. As per Free Support Principle it is recommended to test snap functionality in a non-Whonix based Template before attempting the same procedure inside Whonix ™.

flatpak

TODO: introduction

https://flatpak.org ^[archive]

flatpak Package Manager Security

This entry compares flatpak security features (such as signed metadata) against Debian's APT package manager. With one caveat, flatpak package manager security is comparable to Debian's APT package manager: Flatpak currently does not defend against indefinite freeze attacks ^[archive].

A definition of indefinite freeze attacks is provided by TUF (The Update Framework) Threat Model ^[archive]:

An attacker continues to present files to a software update system files that the client has already seen. As a result, the client is kept unaware of new files.

For many adversaries this attack is difficult because it requires breaking TLS. While flatpak package version information is not protected by a valid-until field ^[archive], it is fetched over TLS. Adversaries capable of breaking TLS face an obstacle when dealing with torified connections (like those in Whonix ™) -- an indefinite freeze attack cannot target a specific user, but will affect all Tor users. This increases the chances of being caught unless they also have the ability to break Tor. Even then the attack chain would be very complex:

• Break Tor → Target specific user(s) → Break TLS → Mount an indefinite freeze attack → Exploit a vulnerability caused by an outdated software version.

To safeguard against this possibility, it is recommended to perform manual checks of version numbers for flatpak-installed applications -- they should match those available from the flathub repository. Every flathub application has a corresponding website page with an Additional information section that lists Updated and Version information. For example, at the time of writing for Chromium:

• This is the associated org.chromium.Chromium flathub website page ^[archive].
• The additional information section lists:
  • Updated: October 5, 2021
  • Version: 94.0.4606.71

Researching version information on the flathub website with a browser is equally vulnerable to indefinite freeze attacks because it also relies upon TLS. It is therefore recommended to use Whonix ™ or Tor Browser for this purpose.

Sometimes APT software versions are quite old, which can lead to less functionality or even exposure to known vulnerabilities that are being exploited in the wild (see footnote). Conversely, flatpak usually offers more recent software versions and/or deploys security fixes in a more timely manner.

In summary, flatpak advantages are considered to outweigh the potential risks of an indefinite freeze attack because the attack chain is complex. Also, flatpak is sometimes the only trustworthy, easy-to-use software source that provides newer versions than available in Debian stable (with Frozen Packages) (or newer).

Forum discussion:

• flathub as a source of software ^[archive].

Qubes OS Specific

At the time of writing, applications installed using flatpak do not present in the Qubes start menu.
Workaround: navigate to Qube settings → applications tab → press "Refresh Applications".

Foreign Sources

For most use cases the extensive software range available from the official Debian repositories should be sufficient. A selection of nearly 60,000 programs can be installed within a couple of steps. These packages are constantly maintained for bug/security fixes and are tightly integrated to provide a stable distribution.

To guarantee stability, no new versions are uploaded to Debian stable archives to avoid breaking the system. This makes Debian stable a dependable distribution and an excellent base for downstream distributions. However, the Linux software scene is very dynamic and sometimes users will want software that is not yet packaged in Debian. In this case it may be necessary to install software from separate sources; either from third party repositories, as a stand-alone precompiled .deb binary, or directly compiled source packages.

Risks

Foreign sources should be used infrequently because it can cause problems. Note this is simply a warning about the worst case scenario and not a predetermined outcome of installing third party software.

Security Issues

Foreign sources pose important security implications for the affected system. Installing software is tantamount to granting root privileges to the developers. Software originating from dubious sources could replace important system components with malicious versions that allow backdoors or Trojan horses ^[archive] to be installed on the system.

In general, the installation of software is a matter of trust. The fact is every installed software source must be trusted. This trust is two-fold: firstly that the developers have integrity, and secondly that the community will notice any suspicious code, which might indicate compromise of the developers' machines.

Dependency Hell

Manually installed packages can contain library versions that are unavailable in the standard repositories. This causes problems with dependency resolution when installing additional software from the official repository. Individual applications are less critical in this context, but when important system libraries in the third-party software are considered, complications are inevitable.

Depending on the severity of the complications, upgrades to the next version of the operating system might fail, or the system may become unbootable or generally unstable.

Mitigation

To reduce security risks and eliminate the risk of making the workstation unusable, utilize Multiple Whonix-Workstation ™.

Qubes-Whonix ™ users: For installation inside Qubes templates, the risk can only be minimized by using Multiple Qubes-Whonix ™ Templates.

GUI Applications with Root Rights

Moved to Safely Use Root Commands: Graphical Applications with Root Rights.

Footnotes

---

Whonix ™ is Supported by Evolution Host DDoS Protected VPS. Stay private and get your VPS with Bitcoin or Monero.

---

Fosshost	About Advertisements

---

Search engines: YaCy | Qwant | ecosia | MetaGer | peekier | Whonix ™ Wiki

---

Follow:

Support:

Donate:

Interested in becoming an author for the Whonix ™ News Blog or writing about anonymity, privacy and security? Please get in touch!

Priority Support | Investors | Professional Support

Whonix ™ | © ENCRYPTED SUPPORT LP | Freedom Software / Open Source (Why?)

The personal opinions of moderators or contributors to the Whonix ™ project do not represent the project as a whole.