Easy[edit]

Introduction[edit]

A primary Whonix ™ goal is to greatly reduce the risk posed by (additional) software installations that are not exclusively designed to work with Tor.

Users can install any software inside Whonix-Workstation ™ using apt-get, since it is based on Debian. However, this is not a recommendation for installing additional software.

Whonix ™ is currently the most secure platform for running Tor-unsafe applications like Adobe Flash; see the operating system comparison.

The Whonix ™ software page lists:

• Pre-installed Whonix ™ applications which are available for different tasks.
• Recommended software for different user activities.
• Safety advice.
• Installation instructions.

Install from Debian stable[edit]

To install a package from Debian stable, follow the steps below. Replace package-name with the name of the software you want to install.

sudo apt-get update

sudo apt-get dist-upgrade

sudo apt-get install --no-install-recommends package-name

There are numerous examples of this procedure in the Software chapter and throughout the wiki.

Best Practices[edit]

Table: Best Software Installation Practices

More Security[edit]

General Advice[edit]

Whonix ™ users are free to install their favorite software packages, but should be aware that additional software increases the attack surface ^[archive] of the platform. Almost any application can be installed, with a few exceptions for programs that are impossible to torify ^[archive]. In addition, Whonix ™ provides:

• Protection from IP and DNS leaks (see above for details).
• Partial protection against protocol leaks and fingerprinting, but this is far from perfect.

Users are responsible for trying to prevent any other protocol leaks ^[archive] using the "Torify: How-to" guide ^[archive], but most of those are mitigated by Whonix ™.

apt-get Meta-data[edit]

When updating with apt-get, information will leak about which software packages and versions have been installed, unless Tor onion repositories have been configured. ^[9] This meta-data cannot be directly linked to any other activity like web browsing, because the Whonix ™ apt-get uwt wrapper forces it to pass through its own circuit. Despite this isolation, it is still possible for updates to be correlated with the same pseudonym. ^{[10] [11]}

Recommendations[edit]

For greater security when updating:

• Follow the guidelines below.
• Be especially careful when adding custom repositories, particularly Personal Package Archives (PPAs). Single developers are more easily pressured and/or likely to have malicious intent than the main distribution repositories.
• Read the protocol leak and fingerprinting protection entry first. It highlights useful information, like the fact that DNS and IP-related leaks do not apply to Whonix ™.
• Refer to the Tor Project's Torify: How-to ^[archive] which discusses various protocol leaks ^[archive] and how to mitigate them.
• Review the Tor Project's Transparent Proxy Leaks ^[archive] documentation, which is particularly relevant for Microsoft Windows.

How-to: Install or Update with Utmost Caution[edit]

1. Stop all activities and shutdown any open applications like Tor Browser.
2. Change the Tor circuit (this step may not apply if the user is running an onion service). ^[12]
3. Update using apt-get after a random delay. By default, a new Tor circuit is generated after 10 seconds.
4. Change the Tor circuit again.
5. Continue user activities after another random period has elapsed.

Whonix-Workstation ™ is Firewalled[edit]

The Whonix-Gateway ™ firewall ^[13] has several effects upon the Whonix-Workstation ™:

• Incoming connections are not supported.
  • If programs make outgoing connections, then incoming connections are accepted for web browsing, IRC, or other relevant applications.
  • Server ports ("open ports") are blocked.
  • The Ident Protocol / web server listening port is not reachable, unless it is explicitly configured.
• Onion Services can be hosted.
• Standard DNS requests on UDP port 53 are redirected to Tor's DnsPort. ^[14]

Also note:

• Tor does not support UDP. This is not a Whonix ™-specific issue.
• Tor only partially supports IPv6 ^[archive], although full implementation is likely in the near term. ^[15] This is not a Whonix ™-specific issue. ^[16]
• All traffic originating from Whonix-Workstation ™ and Whonix-Gateway ™ is routed over Tor. ^{[17] [18] [19] [20]} Users should read the footnotes on the left-hand side.

The firewall on the Whonix-Gateway ™ is very restrictive. It can be made even more restrictive by activating #OptionalFeatureNr.3# within the firewall script. It is possible to limit which outgoing ports are redirected to Tor's TransPort. Depending on what the user is trying to achieve, it could also be useful to remove all SocksPorts.

Related:

• Whonix-Workstation ™ Firewall
• Ports

Advanced[edit]

Backports[edit]

sudo su -c "echo -e 'deb tor+https://deb.debian.org/debian buster-backports main contrib non-free' > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/backports.list"

sudo su -c "echo -e 'deb tor+http://vwakviie2ienjx6t.onion/debian buster-backports main contrib non-free' > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/backports.list"

sudo apt-get update

sudo apt-get -t buster-backports install package-name

sudo rm /etc/apt/sources.list.d/backports.list

Install from Debian Testing[edit]

Before completing steps in this section, first read Prefer Packages from Debian Stable Repository. Carefully check how packages will change before proceeding -- a host of upgrades is usually safe, but no Whonix ™ packages should be removed as part of the process; see Whonix Debian Packages. Be aware that problems are still possible - see here ^[archive] for an example.

It is recommended to complete this process in a separate Whonix-Workstation ™ (whonix-ws-15-debian-testing-mix) due to the risks. Ask for advice in the forums on a case-by-case basis.

sudo su -c "echo -e 'deb http://http.debian.net/debian bullseye main' > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/testing.list"

sudo su -c "echo -e 'deb tor+http://vwakviie2ienjx6t.onion/debian bullseye main' > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/testing.list"

sudo apt-get update

sudo apt-get -t bullseye install packagename

sudo rm /etc/apt/sources.list.d/testing.list

Install from Debian Unstable[edit]

Before completing steps in this section, first read Prefer Packages from Debian Stable Repository.

Mixing packages from Debian stable with those from a later release like unstable can destabilize the system due to associated software dependencies required for full functionality. First carefully check how packages will change before proceeding. ^[26]

A host of upgrades is usually safe, but no Whonix ™ packages should be removed as part of the process; see Whonix Debian Packages. It is recommended to complete this process in a separate Whonix-Workstation ™ (whonix-ws-15-debian-unstable-mix) due to the risks. Ask for advice in the forums on a case-by-case basis.

sudo su -c "echo -e 'APT::Default-Release buster;' > /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/70defaultrelease"

sudo su -c "echo -e 'deb http://http.debian.net/debian sid main' > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/unstable.list"

sudo su -c "echo -e 'deb tor+http://vwakviie2ienjx6t.onion/debian sid main' > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/unstable.list"

sudo apt-get update

sudo apt-get install package-name/sid

sudo rm /etc/apt/sources.list.d/unstable.list

sudo rm /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/70defaultrelease

Package Reinstallation[edit]

As per the free support principle, package reinstallation utilizes normal Debian processes.

The example below shows how the thunderbird package would be reinstalled. It is possible to substitute thunderbird with many other packages, so long as they do not have too many dependencies. These instructions are not suitable for any packages needed for connectivity such as tor, because the reinstallation would be very difficult and is currently unsupported.

Even in the thunderbird package example, dependency complications emerge. The anon-workstation-packages-recommended package also depends on thunderbird. Further, the whonix-workstation package depends on anon-workstation-packages-recommended.

sudo apt-get purge thunderbird

Reading package lists... Done
Building dependency tree       
Reading state information... Done
The following packages will be REMOVED:
  anon-workstation-packages-recommended* thunderbird* whonix-workstation*
0 upgraded, 0 newly installed, 3 to remove and 0 not upgraded.
After this operation, 90.8 MB disk space will be freed.
Do you want to continue? [Y/n] 
(Reading database ... 100681 files and directories currently installed.)
Removing whonix-workstation (3:2.9-1) ...
Removing anon-workstation-packages-recommended (3:2.9-1) ...
Removing thunderbird (38.4.0esr-1~deb8u1) ...
Purging configuration files for thunderbird (38.4.0esr-1~deb8u1) ...
Processing triggers for hicolor-icon-theme (0.13-1) ...
Processing triggers for menu (2.1.47) ...
Processing triggers for man-db (2.7.0.2-5) ...
Processing triggers for desktop-file-utils (0.22-1) ...
Processing triggers for qubes-core-agent (3.0.20-1+deb8u1) ...
Processing triggers for mime-support (3.58) ...

rm -r ~/.thunderbird

sudo apt-get install --no-install-recommends thunderbird anon-workstation-packages-recommended whonix-workstation

Install Software in a TemplateBasedVM[edit]

There is no reason to avoid installing software in TemplateBasedVMs ^[archive], although software installed this way will not persist across reboots. Users can opt to use a custom script to automate this process, thereby minimizing time spent re-installing packages.

Advantages[edit]

This software installation method means a single VM ^[archive] assumes many of the positive characteristics found in both TemplateBasedVMs and StandaloneVMs ^[archive].

• Centralized Updates: AppVMs ^[archive] are based on a TemplateVM ^[archive]. This means the AppVM's root filesystem is based on the corresponding template's root filesystem. Users need only update the TemplateVM and those updates will be reflected in the TemplateBasedVM's root filesystem upon restart.^[30]
• Minimal Disk Usage: TemplateBasedVMs require much less disk space than StandaloneVMs, since the AppVM's root filesystem is based the corresponding template. The AppVM only requires enough disk space to hold user files in the /home directory.
• Semi-persistent Storage: User data stored in /home , /rw and /usr/local survives reboot. Many applications like Signal ^[archive] and Wire ^[archive] store user data in the /home folder. Since the custom script installs the software seamlessly with little or no user interaction, the AppVM has "quasi-full persistence", not unlike a StandaloneVM's full persistence.

AppVM Preparation[edit]

AppVM Use[edit]

Once user preparation is complete and the AppVM is started, it will automatically start the script to begin installing software. When the process finishes, the AppVM can be used like any other TemplateBasedVM. However when the AppVM is shutdown, all data outside of the persistent /home folder will be lost, including the newly installed software packages. Following reboot, the VM will again install the software packages automatically.

Using bind-dirs Selective Persistence[edit]

Using selective bind-dirs ^[archive] persistence is currently a difficult problem and undocumented. Further research is required to ascertain which files require persistence across VM reboots.

Add Application Launcher to Start Menu[edit]

mkdir -p ~/.local/share/applications

mousepad ~/.local/share/applications/program-name.desktop

[Desktop Entry]
Type=Application
Exec=/path/to/program
Name=program-name
Categories=Other

snap[edit]

General forum discussion about snap: Snap Store / snaps / snapd / snapcraft.io - a new software source? ^[archive]

Qubes-Whonix ™ issues:

• Efforts to persistently install snap apps in Qubes-Whonix ™ via bind-dirs ^[archive] or with snap proxy settings have proven unsuccessful. This means it needs to be installed in a TemplateBasedVM on every occasion it is required. Efforts to improve this situation are most welcome, see: Wickr Me vs Qubes-Whonix Persistence ^[archive] and snap totally unusable on Qubes whonix-ws ^[archive].
• Qubes TemplateVMs are non-networked by Qubes default. (APT works because of Qubes' qrexec-based updates proxy.) Therefore snap does not run inside whonix-ws TemplateVM. The same would probably also happen in any other Qubes TempalteVMs such as for example in a Debian TempalteVM. As per Free Support Principle is recommend to make snap work in a non-Whonix based TemplateVM first such as a Debian TemplateVM before attempting to do the same inside Whonix ™.

Foreign Sources[edit]

In most cases, the extensive software range available from the official Debian repositories should be enough to satisfy the user's needs. A selection of more than 50,000 programs can be installed within a couple of steps. These packages are constantly maintained for bug/security fixes and tightly integrated to provide a stable distribution.

To guarantee stability, no new versions are uploaded to Debian stable archives to avoid breaking the system. This makes Debian stable a dependable distribution and an excellent base for downstream distributions. However, the Linux software scene is very dynamic and sometimes the user will want software that is not yet packaged in Debian. In this instance, it may be necessary to install software from separate sources; either from third party repositories, as a stand-alone precompiled .deb binary, or directly compiled source packages. ^[33]

Risks[edit]

The use of foreign sources should be kept to a minimum, as it may cause problems. Note this is simply a warning about the worst case scenario and not a predetermined outcome of installing third party software.

Security Issues[edit]

Keep in mind that foreign sources pose important security implications for the user's system. Installing software is tantamount to granting root privileges to the developers. Software originating from dubious sources could replace important system components with malicious versions that allow backdoors or Trojan horses ^[archive] to be installed on the system.

In general, the installation of software is a matter of trust. The fact is that users have to trust every software source they install. This trust is two-fold: firstly that the developers have integrity, and secondly that the community will notice any suspicious code, which might indicate compromise of the developers' machines. ^[34]

Dependency Hell[edit]

Manually installed packages can contain library versions not available in the standard repositories. This causes problems with dependency resolution when installing additional software from the official repository. Individual applications are less critical in this context, but when important system libraries in the third-party software are considered, complications are inevitable.

Depending on the severity of the complications, upgrades to the next version of the operating system might fail, or the system may become unbootable or generally unstable.

Mitigation[edit]

Users can reduce security risks and eliminate the risk of making the workstation unusable by using Multiple Whonix-Workstation ™.

GUI Applications with Root Rights[edit]

Moved to root - Graphical Applications with Root Rights.

Footnotes[edit]

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